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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This matter involves the final decision and order of the Fourth District Court in
and for the County of Juab in the matter of Essential Botanical Farms v. Kay. As a
result, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this appeal arose out of the District Court's grant of summary
judgment quieting title in plaintiff and appellee, Essential Botanical Farms (hereinafter
"Appellee" or "EBF"), to a parcel of real property located in Juab County, Utah. In
granting summary judgment in favor of EBF, the District Court concluded that the burden
of proof in boundary by acquiescence (hereinafter "the Doctrine") cases is proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Even though the District Court held that the burden of
proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is a preponderance of the evidence, the court
stated that it would evaluate Appellee's claims based upon a clear and convincing
standard. The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of EBF and
against Steven L. Kay (hereinafter "Appellant", "Appellant Kay", or "Mr. Kay"),
reasoning that evidence showing mere occupation up to a fence line and the subjective
belief of two tenants that the fence line was the boundary were sufficient to prove
acquiescence of Appellant's predecessors by clear and convincing evidence. In addition,
even though the District Court stated that it evaluated Appellee's claim of acquiescence
on a clear and convincing standard, Mr. Kay believes that in fact, the District Court
applied a preponderance standard in granting Appellee summary judgment based upon
the Doctrine.
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Issue for review: Did the District Court err in concluding that the burden of proof
where a court divests a record owner of fee title based on the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence?
Standard of review: De novo. The burden of proof which the courts apply in a
civil matter is an issue of law that appellate courts review for correctness. Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, \ 41, 164 P.3d 384.
Issue for review: Did the District Court err in concluding that evidence that the
predecessors of a defendant landowner occupied up to a fence combined with the
subjective belief of two tenants that the fence was the boundary, in the complete absence
of other evidence of the acquiescence of the defendant landowner or his predecessors-intitle, was evidence sufficient to establish the defendant landowner's predecessor's
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence?
Standard of review: De novo. A district court's decision to grant summary
judgment is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009
UT 61,1(10, 639 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. "When an appellate court reviews a district court's
grant of summary judgment, cthe facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are
viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,' Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe
Trust, 2004 UT 85, \ 2, 100 P. 3d 1200. The district court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness, MISCO,
2005 UT 91,^17, 127P.3d697."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a small triangular piece of real property approximately six acres
in size located in Juab County, Utah. The parcel is created by a fence line on the east and
a deed line on the west, both of which run generally north-south. The parcel is narrow
and triangular in shape with the point of the triangle pointing south. The east leg of the
triangle (the deed line) and the west leg of the triangle (the fence line) are approximately
2700 feet long. The third leg of the triangle, on the north end, runs east-west, and is
approximately 130 feet in length. The parties to the present suit are adjoining
landowners. Appellant Kay owns the property that comprises the triangle. That is, Kay
owns the property west of the deed line and east of the fence line. Appellee owns the
property east of the deed line. Appellee's predecessors have occupied the triangle and up
to the fence for over forty years. The dispute between the parties is whether the fence
line or the deed line is the boundary between Appellant Kay's property on the west and
Appellee EBF's property on the east.
The Complaint was filed in the Fourth District Court on or about May 26, 2005.
Service of Mr. Kay was personal, and the return of service was filed on or about June 6,
2005. Mr. Kay filed his Answer on or about June 24, 2005.
On or about September 17, 2007, EBF filed a motion for partial summary
judgment and a supporting memorandum. On or about October 25, 2007, Mr. Kay filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment and a combined memorandum in opposition to
EBF's motion for partial summary judgment and in support of Mr. Kay's cross-motion
for summary judgment. EBF filed a combined memorandum in opposition to Mr. Kay's
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cross-motion and in reply and support of its motion for partial summary judgment on or
about November 28, 2007. Finally, Mr. Kay filed his reply memorandum in support of
his cross-motion for summary judgment on or about January 4, 2008. Oral argument was
heard on or about March 13, 2008. The court took the matter under advisement, and on
May 13, 2008, it issued a ruling in favor of EBF. Final judgment was entered on October
13, 2009. Mr. Kay filed his notice of appeal on October 29, 2009. This Court elected to
retain this appeal on its docket by order dated November 30, 2009.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The property involved in this appeal consists of approximately six acres

located in Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, SLBM (hereinafter "Section 4").
R. 298.
2.

Section 4 is located in the Mona Valley, near Mona, Utah, in the valley

floor. R. 298.
3.

When Section 4 was originally surveyed by the Office of the Surveyor

General in 1856, the north quarter corner of Section 4 (hereinafter the utNorth Quarter
Corner") was marked with a monument. R. 298.
4.

The original monument was a post in a mound of earth and pit. R. 298.

5.

Sometime after the location of the original North Quarter Corner

monument, U. S. Highway 91 was built over the monument, which was destroyed. R.
298.
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6.

In 2005, the North Quarter Corner position was prorated and a Juab County

witness corner was placed sixty (60) feet east of the true corner, near the easterly
boundary of the highway. R. 299.
7.

Based upon the notes of the original 1856 survey and the 2005 witness

corner, the location of North Quarter Corner of Section 4 is accurately shown in a survey
plat prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying which is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit A. Addendum, Exhibit A. R. 211, 298.
8.

On Exhibit A, the North Quarter Corner is an unmarked diamond midway

between the NE Corner of Section 4 and the NW Corner of Section 4. Addendum,
Exhibit A. R. 21, 297.
9.

The North Quarter Corner marks the northernmost point of a line extended

(the "Quarter Section Line"), that divides Appellant's and Appellee's deeded properties.
Addendum, Exhibit A. R. 211, 297.
10.

In the vicinity of the disputed property, the location of the boundary

between the west half of Section 4 and east half of Section 4 is correctly shown in
Addendum, Exhibit A.
11.

R. 211, 239, 297.

Appellant's eastern deed line is shown on Exhibit A by the following

courses and distances: N02°38'39"E 1349.46'; N02°38'38"E 1352.17'. Appendix,
Exhibit A. R. 211,297.
12.

This eastern deed line to Appellant's property is 2701.63 feet long (1349.

49ft+1352.17 ft = 2701.63 ft). Appendix, Exhibit A. R. 211, 297.
13.

While Appellee's property extends to the North Quarter Corner for a total
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of 4051.78 feet (1349.49 + 1352.17 + 1350.15 ft - 4051.78), the property at issue in this
appeal is only that between Appellant's and Appellee's property and is therefore 2701.63
feet in length. Exhibit A. R. 211,297.
14.

The location of the fence at issue in this action is also accurately reflected

in Exhibit A to the Addendum and is identified with an arrow and in printed handwriting
on Exhibit A as "Fence". R. 239, 297.
15.

The fence in question has been in existence for over forty years. R. 233.

16.

Appellant Kay holds fee title ownership of the real property west of the

deed line (the Quarter Section Line) and east of the fence by reason of a Warranty Deed
recorded on June 20, 2004 as Entry Number 00235619, in Book 0466 at Page 0641, in
the official records of the Juab County Recorder. Addendum, Exhibit B. R. 238.
17.

Appellee holds fee title ownership of real property east of the deed line (the

Quarter Section Line) by reason of a Special Warranty Deed recorded on March 13,
1998, as Entry Number 00212715, in Book 0391 at Page 0181, also in the official records
of the Juab County Recorder. Addendum, Exhibit C. R. 238.
18.

Appellant's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Appellant's land from

the United States in 1890. R. 297.
19.

Appellee's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Appellee's land from

the United States in 1905. R. 297.
20.

Through mesne conveyances, Appellant's property was conveyed to

Appellant in 2004. R. 237-238.
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21.

Through mesne conveyances, Appellee's property was conveyed to

Appellee in 1998. R. 235-236.
22.

Beginning in the 1950's, Kay's predecessors dry fanned their side of the

fence. R. 234.
23.

Kay's predecessors' farming activities continued until it was sold to Kay.

R.234.
24.

Prior owners of Kay's property, John L. Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch

Cloward, Olive and Daryl Stanley, have not testified in this case. R. 297.
25.

Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, who were relatives of owners John L.

Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch Cloward, and Olive and Daryl Stanley, never owned fee
title to Appellant's property at any time. R. 297.
26.

Tom Fowkes worked on Appellant's property from the time he was a small

child. R.234.
27.

He continued to farm the land until the 1970's or even later. R. 234.

28.

Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Tom Fowkes

testified as follows:
Q:

All right. . . . Looking again at the survey (Exhibit A to Appendix),
just based upon your experience with the property and working on the
farm, where did you understand the boundary to be between the
properties we've been talking about [the Kay and EBF properties]?

A:

On the fence line.

R. 234.
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29

Dale Fowkes conducted farming activities on the farm until it was sold to

Appellant Kay R 233
30

Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Dale Fowkes

testified as follows
Q

Okay Based upon your experience with the -- the property
that we've been talking about and you've testified today what
was your understanding where the boundary was between your
family's property and the Andrews [EBF's] property7

A

The - fence-where the fence was

R 232
31

Appellee's predecessors ran cattle on their property m the 1950's R 230

32

Later, Appellee's predecessors grazed their property R 227, 230

33

Appellee's predecessors in title testified that they thought the fence was the

boundary R 223-224, 226, 229
34

The parties' predecessors never had any discussion or discussions about the

lence, or whether the fence was or was not a boundary R 226, 227-228, 297
35

From time to time, Appellee's predecessors Andrews' cattle would get

through the fence R 296
36

It was the working arrangement between the Andrews and the Fowkes that

whoever was running cattle had the responsibility to maintain the fence R 296
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At its core, this case involves a taking That is, divesting a citizen of fee title to
real property he purchased and which was conveyed to him m propeily executed,

Page 8 of40

delivered, and recorded documents of title. Real property rights enjoy constitutional
protection under both the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution and the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Both due process clauses direct that as
the importance of the constitutionally protected interest increases, so too should the
burden of proof increase to protect citizens from the unjust deprivation of their
constitutionally protected rights. Real property rights are among the highest recognized
in the law in large part because real property is unique. In light of the importance the law
affords real property rights, due process requires that a litigant who wishes to divest
another of fee title to real property must prove his or her case by clear and convincing
evidence.
In the context of boundary by acquiescence, when one considers the high
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence in connection with the evidence in
this case, the fact that a landowner occupied up to a fence line combined with the
subjective belief of two tenants that the fence line was the boundary cannot satisfy the
degree of proof constitutionally required for such a taking. Also, while this evidence
may establish the occupation element by clear and convincing evidence, allowing
evidence of mere occupation to satisfy Appellee's burden to prove acquiescence would
result in the merger of the occupation-up-to-a-visible-line elements of the Doctrine with
the acquiescence element, thereby obviating a plaintiffs burden to prove each of the four
elements of a boundary by acquiescence case. Importantly, the element that plaintiff
would no longer be required to prove would be the element that forms the very core of
the doctrine: acquiescence.
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Because in the present case there is nothing in the record, other than the fact of
mere occupation, to indicate that Kay's predecessors subjectively intended to recognize
the fence as the boundary, EBF failed to prove acquiescence by Kay's predecessors by
clear and convincing evidence. The District Court was therefore in error in both granting
EBF's motion and denying Kay's motion. The District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of EBF should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to
enter summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kay.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CASES IS
PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
a.

The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution and the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution Require that the Burden of
Proof in Boundary By Acquiescence is Proof By Clear and
Convincing Evidence.

Owners of real property are protected against deprivation of their property rights
under both the Utah and the United States Constitutions. See Utah Const. Art. I § 1
("All men have the inherent and inalienable right to acquire, possess and protect property.
. . ."); Utah Const. Art. I § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."); United States Const. Amend. XIV ("No state shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . ."). The
burden of proof in cases that might deprive a vested landowner of his real property rights
is the essential mechanism that fulfills the mandate of the Due Process Clauses of Utah
and United States Constitutions. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
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[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to instruct the fact finder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).
That is to say, due process requires the burden of proof to reflect society's tolerance for
the risk of error in the particular matter. Id.
This rationale applies with equal force to the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution. Indeed, this Court has recently adopted the Addington Court's rationale.
Egbert v. Nissan North America, 2007 UT 64, % 12 FN 6, 167 P. 3d 1058. Furthermore,
this Court has also stated that because the two due process clauses are so textually
similar, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are "highly persuasive as to the
application of [the Due Process Clause] of our state Constitution." Terra Util. Inc. v.
Public Service Comrn'n, 575 P. 2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1978). That being the case, the Due
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution also requires the burden of proof applied in the
present case to reflect society's low tolerance for errors in real property boundaries. In
light of the Addington Court's analysis, and this Court's analysis in Egbert, a review of
our society's tolerance for error in adjudicating real property boundaries is therefore
warranted.
Tolerance for errors in real property boundaries in our society is exceedingly low.
For proof of this fact, one need look no further than the existence of the land survey
industry, the title examination industry, the title insurance industry, all of which are
licensed and regulated by the state, as well as the records, indices, and plats that are
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maintained in the offices of county recorders throughout the state. Each year, substantial
public resources are devoted to recording, indexing, and platting documents, making
them accessible to the world, all for the purpose of establishing and promoting the
stability and accuracy of real property boundaries. Likewise, each year individuals spend
substantial sums of money out of their own pockets for surveyors to pin point the
boundaries of their properties, and untold dollars for title examination and title insurance
to protect their real property interests. The continued development of increasingly
accurate technologies such as laser and GPS surveying equipment also demonstrates the
high value our society places on the accuracy of real property boundaries, and its
corollary: society's extremely low tolerance for errors in the same.
In light of this low tolerance for risk of error in locating real property boundaries,
the Court's analysis in Addington, and this Court's analysis in Egbert, it is only logical
that the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases must be proof by clear and
convincing evidence. Requiring proof only by a preponderance of the evidence would
offend due process requirements by giving short shrift to society's low tolerance for
errors in boundaries between real properties and would fail to adequately protect rights
our state deems so important that they are explicitly declared and protected by our state
constitution.
b.

Other Legal Doctrines Altering Real Property Rights Require Clear
and Convincing Evidence.

That a higher burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence is required should not
come as a surprise. A review of cases enlisting the judicial power of Article VIII of the
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Utah Constitution to deprive a landowner of a real property interest discloses that in those
cases, courts can only effect such a deprivation if this extraordinary exercise of judicial
power is justified by clear and convincing evidence. Perhaps the most persuasive
example is found in the doctrine of abandonment of easements. This doctrine,
conceptually speaking, is essentially identical to boundary by acquiescence. The only
difference between the two doctrines is the nature of the property interest at stake.
Easement abandonment puts a servitude at issue while boundary by acquiescence places
fee title at issue. In all other respects, the doctrines are conceptually indistinguishable.
Under the law of abandonment of easements, clear and convincing evidence of the
dominant estate's owner's intent to abandon is required when a party claims that an
easement has been abandoned. Western Gateway Storage v. Tresdeder, 567 P. 2d 181
(Utah 1977).1
Similarly, a party that attacks the validity of a deed must prove his or her case by
clear and convincing evidence. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984) (citing
Controlled Receivablesy Inc. v. Barman, 413 P. 2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966) ("Before
discussing the evidentiary facts, certain fundamental rules of law should be set forth. Of
prime importance is the rule that one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must so prove
by clear and convincing evidence.")). When a governmental entity enlists the judicial
machinery to take private property against a landowner's will and dedicate it to public

1 Because Kay believes that the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and abandonment
of easements are so conceptually similar and therefore highly persuasive on both issues
presented in this appeal, appellant will address below in greater detail the impact of the
doctrine of abandonment of easements on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
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use as a road or highway, it is required to prove each element of its claim by clear and
convincing evidence. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). Similarly, a party seeking to burden a vested landowner's property without the
landowner's consent by way of a prescriptive easement must prove each element of his or
her case by clear and convincing evidence. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P. 2d 677, 682
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary
elements by clear and convincing evidence."). Furthermore, a party seeking to take
property through adverse possession based on parol gift must prove each element of that
doctrine by clear and convincing evidence. Raleigh v. Wells, 81 P. 908, 910 (Utah
1905).
c. Legal Doctrines Altering Other Property Rights Demand Proof
by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
In a similar vein, in those cases that involve invoking a legal doctrine to deprive a
properly vested title holder of all, or some part, of his or her property interests, this Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the Utah Legislature have demanded proof by clear and
convincing evidence. Glauser Storage v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141,1119, 27 P. 3d 565,
569 (clear and convincing evidence required to prove that a deed was actually intended as
a mortgage and therefore entitled to be treated as such (equitable mortgage)); Swenson v.
Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ^ 22, 998 P. 2d 807, 813 (clear and convincing evidence required
to prove abandonment of a restrictive covenant); In re Ashton, 898 P. 2d 824, 826 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) (clear and convincing evidence that at the time of forming a joint tenancy,
there was no intent to create the right of survivorship required to overcome the
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presumption in favor of joint tenancy with right of survivorship is valid); Davis v. Young,
2008 UT App. 246, ^j 15, 190 P. 3d 23, 26 (clear and convincing evidence required for
revocation of a trust that is not specifically stated to be revocable); Utah Code Ann. § 756-104(1) (2009) (clear and convincing evidence required to prevent a surviving tenant in
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship account from taking ownership of the whole
account); Panos v. Olsen & Associates Const, 2005 UT App 446, \ 19, 123 P.3d 816,
821 (clear and convincing evidence of mutual mistake required to avoid merger of a sales
contract into a properly executed and delivered deed).
d.

Other Cases Involving Judicial Interference with Constitutionally
Protected Interests Require Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Interestingly enough, though perhaps not surprising in light of the Addington
Court's analysis and this Court's analysis in Egbert, a review of the cases in which Utah
courts require proof by clear and convincing evidence discloses that a significant majority
of those cases involve the use of the judicial power to deprive a citizen of a
constitutionally protected right or interest. See e. g., Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App.
233, \ 29, 217 P. 3d 733 (civil contempt); In reA.F.K., 2009 Ut App. 233, ^ 29, 216 P.
3d 980 (clear and convincing evidence required to state case of prima facie child
abandonment - right to raise and rear one's children (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57,
66, 120S.Ct.2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000))); In re A. M, 2009 Ut App. 118^30, 208 p.
3d 1058, 1065 (clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in
child's best interest required before terminating parental rights).
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In sum, a review of the situations in which civil courts demand proof by clear and
convincing evidence discloses that this demanding evidentiary standard is "appropriate
when the interests at stake in a civil case are particularly important and more substantial
than the mere loss of money." Egbert, 2007 UT at ^[13 (citing Addington, 441 U. S. at
424) (internal quotations omitted).
Mr. Kay respectfully submits that real property ownership is precisely the kind of
"particularly important" interest that, when put at issue, triggers the demands of due
process and requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is well established that
real property is unique. For example, the unique character of real property is what makes
an order of specific performance appropriate rather than the most common civil award,
money damages. See Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 592 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1974) (affirming
trial court's order of specific performance requiring defendant to execute and deliver a
special warranty deed conveying the disputed real property to plaintiff). Because of this
uniqueness, due process demands that a litigant who seeks to divest a citizen of fee title
to real property based upon a claim of boundary by acquiescence must prove her case by
clear and convincing evidence.
e.

Demanding Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence When Affecting
a Judicial Taking of Real Property Rights Is Sound Public Policy.

Finally, Mr. Kay submits that sound public policy also demands clear and
convincing evidence in boundary by acquiescence cases. As discussed above, each year
substantial public resources are devoted to recording, indexing, and platting documents of
title in the offices of the county recorders of the state. Likewise, untold dollars and
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resources are spent each year in the private sector to pay for surveys to pinpoint real
property boundaries. The statutory requirements and infrastructure that enable the transfer
of real property from one owner to another based upon written instruments are fully
developed and well known. See U.C. A. §25-1-1 (Statute of Frauds); U.C. A. §57-1-1 et
seq., (Conveyances); U.C. A. § 57-3-102, (Race-Notice); and U.C. A. § 17-21-1 etseq.,
(Recorder's Act). In contrast, boundary by acquiescence is an exception because it is a
legal doctrine that re-aligns real property boundaries based on inferences drawn from the
conduct of the parties, as opposed to properly executed and recorded documents of title.
While there can be no question that the Doctrine fills an important gap in our law, there
can also be no question that it is a mechanism for the transfer of real property that occurs
outside the ordinary and usual system of conveying real property interests.
This being the case, the wiser policy is to apply the doctrine restrictively,
consistent with this Court's observation in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah
1990). Restrictive application of the doctrine enhances reliance on the established and
conventional methods of real property conveyancing. In contrast, expanding the
doctrine's application by requiring only proof by a preponderance of evidence would
undermine society's reliance on properly executed and recorded documents of title. A
key mechanism, if not the only means of ensuring a restrictive application of the doctrine,
is a high burden of proof. Sound public policy therefore demands proof by clear and
convincing evidence before a court may re-align deeded property boundaries set forth in
properly executed and recorded written instruments through an application of the
Doctrine.
Page 17 of 40

In sum, our society places a high value on the right to own and protect real
property. So substantial are these rights that they are protected by the United States
Constitution, and are specifically guaranteed in the Utah Constitution. Furthermore, our
society places considerable value in the ability to predictably and reliably determine real
property boundaries through the records of the county recorders. Consistent with this
high premium, courts routinely require the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in
cases that involve divesting an owner of his or her real property interests. Similarly, in
cases where courts infringe on constitutionally protected interests, they require proof by
clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Kay respectfully submits that for purposes of
determining the burden of proof, there is no meaningful distinction between the doctrines
cited above and the doctrine in this case: boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the
burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is proof by clear and convincing
evidence.
2.

IN THE CONTEXT OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE, A PARTY
ACQUIESCES WHEN HE OR SHE HAS THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT TO
RECOGNIZE A VISIBLE LINE AS THE PROPERTY BOUNDARY.
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are well settled. They are: 1)

occupation; 2) up to a visible line; 3) mutual acquiescence in the line as the property
boundary; 4) for a long time. Staker, 785 P. 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). Three of the four
elements are well established, and relatively uncomplicated in their application.
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However, the acquiescence element remains anything but clear.

Indeed, after an

exhaustive review of the cases on this doctrine, the only thing that is clear is that the
concept of acquiescence continues to be "the source of considerable confusion and
controversy among judges, lawyers, and landowners in this state." Id. at 422. It appears
that a significant reason for this persistent confusion is the lack of a workable definition
of acquiescence. While this Court has laid the groundwork for a definition of
acquiescence, it has yet to state a definition of what acquiescence means in this context.
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^19, 44 P. 3d 781, 788 ("to acquiesce, a landowner must
recognize and treat an observable line . . . as the boundary dividing the owner's property
from the adjacent landowner's property, regardless of whether the landowner knows
where the actual boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain."). To this end,
Appellant Kay respectfully submits that acquiescence in this context consists of the
landowner's subjective intent to recognize a visible line as the property boundary.
a.

Occupation and Acquiescence Are Factually Distinct and Separate
Legal Elements of the Doctrine.

It is self-apparent that the occupation element and acquiescence elements are, in
fact, separate requirements of the Doctrine, each of which must be separately proven in
order for a claimant to prevail. However, in the reported cases, the line between the two
elements is sometimes blurred because it has been stated that evidence of occupation up
to a visible line can, under certain circumstances, be evidence of acquiescence. RHN

2

For example, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1988, defines
"acquiescence" as a noun. It is the "act of acquiescing" or an "instance of acquiescing".
Similarly, "acquiesce" is also a verb defined as "to accept or comply tacitly or passively."
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Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ^ 25, 96 P. 3d 935. To muddy the waters further,
sometimes mere occupation up to a line is not proof of acquiescence. Id. (citing Hales v.
Frakes, 600 P. 2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979)). It is important however, to acknowledge that
occupation and acquiescence are factually distinct and separate elements of the Doctrine.
b.

The Acquiescence Element Contemplates the Subjective Intent of the
Landowner.

In Ault, this Court stated that acquiescence is "[a] person's tacit or passive
acceptance; implied consent to an act." Ault, 2002 UT at ^[18 (citing Black's Law
Dictionary 23 (7th ed. 1999)). From this definition, and as quoted above, this Court
stated:
to acquiesce, a landowner must recognize and treat an observable
line . . . as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the
adjacent landowner's property, regardless of whether the landowner
knows where the actual boundary lies or whether the boundary is
uncertain.
Id. at \ 19. Lurking in the background of the constructs of an owner's "acceptance" and
"recognition" is the issue of the landowner's subjective intent. That is, whether a
landowner tacitly or passively accepts a line as a boundary, or impliedly consents to the
same, turns on the subjective intent of the landowner. Thus, the occupation element and
acquiescence element ask two separate questions: The occupation element asks if the
landowner occupied up to a visible line; the acquiescence element asks the more
important question, why he or she did so.
The cases bear out this proposition. By way of illustration, acquiescence is
defeated by a mere conversation between the adjoining landowners evidencing an
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ongoing dispute or unwillingness to recognize the line as the boundary. Id. at If 21.
Specifically, in Ault, this Court noted that negotiations had occurred between the parties
concerning the potential of the plaintiff landowner purchasing the disputed property from
the defendant landowner. Id. at \ 22. These negotiations evidenced that neither party
intended to recognize the visible line as the boundary. Id. ("Indeed, evidence that the
Holdens and the Aults discussed the possibility of the Holdens either purchasing or
trading for the disputed parcels unequivocally shows that. . . neither tacitly consented to
the fence as a boundary . . . . " ) . Thus, in Ault, it was evidence that demonstrated that
neither party subjectively intended to recognize the fence as the boundary that defeated
an application of the Doctrine.
Another example is found in Staker, where this Court found that acquiescence had
occurred based on the subjective intent of the parties. In Staker, one of the parties to the
suit, the Shane family, had built a home, a part of which was located on the adjoining
landowner's property, and not on the Shane property. Staker, 785 P. 2d at 421. The
Shanes occupied this home for over eighty years without objection from the adjoining
landowner. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that part of the Shane home was
built on their property. Id. Relying on this fact, this Court concluded that the
acquiescence element had been established. Id. While the Staker Court did not say so
explicitly, its conclusion that acquiescence had occurred was based on the subjective
intent of the parties. Because none of the adjoining landowners had objected to the
location of the Shane home, but had instead occupied up to a fence line, the subjective
intent of the landowners was clear. They intended to recognize the fence as the
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boundary, as opposed to the deed line.
In inferring acquiescence on the part of the adjacent landowner who claimed to the
deed line, the obvious question was this: How could the adjacent landowner have
thought that the deed line was the boundary if he allowed the Shane home to be built on
his property? Stated otherwise, why would the adjacent owner allow someone else to
build on his property? Because a reasonable landowner would not allow another to
permanently occupy his land, the landowner must have had the subjective intent to
recognize the fence as the boundary. Otherwise, he would have sought redress for the
trespass. Accordingly, the landowner had acquiesced in the fence as the boundary.
Other cases where this Court has sustained findings of no acquiescence are also
instructive. For example, in Hales, this Court relied on facts that indicated that the true
purpose of the fence was to control cattle, and as such, was not recognized as a boundary.
Hales, 600 P.2d at 559. In that case, the Court cited to Holmes v. Judge, where the
Court held that "where a fence or other monument which was claimed to mark a
boundary is not actually intended to be a boundary, but is erected for some other purpose,
the parties can claim to the true boundary line and there can be no boundary by
acquiescence." Hales, 600 P.2d at 559 (citingHolmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (Utah
1906)). See also Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1954) (sustaining
trial court's finding that the fence was not intended to be a boundary, but was intended to
prevent sheep from damaging newly planted Box Elder trees.) More recently, this Court
noted that acquiescence consists in the recognition of a line as the boundary. R. H. N.
Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, \ 24 ("Acquiescence is a highly fact-dependent question,
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. . . and acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from the evidence. . . .")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Through these cases, this Court's analysis on acquiescence has revolved around
the subjective intent of the parties, even though it may not have explicitly so stated. In
light of these authorities, Mr. Kay respectfully submits that a property owner acquiesces
in a visible line as the boundary when he or she has the subjective intent to recognize the
visible line as the property boundary.
3.

WITHOUT MORE, MERE OCCUPATION DOES NOT PROVE
ACQUIESCENCE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
As mentioned above, the occupation element and acquiescence element are

distinct requirements of the Doctrine. Because these two elements are distinct from one
another, there must be proof of each to re-align a boundary under the Doctrine.
Accordingly, Mr. Kay respectfully submits that a case with proof of occupation only is
insufficient to prove acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence.
a.

Allowing Acquiescence Based Upon Mere Occupation Results in a
Merging of the First Two Elements of the Doctrine into the Third.

It is undisputed that this Court has stated that evidence of occupation up to a
visible line is relevant on the question of acquiescence. See e. g., Staker, 785 P. 2d at
420-21. However, this Court has also stated that evidence of mere occupation is not
sufficient to establish acquiescence. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559. While this may appear
to be a conflict, it is actually a reflection of the relevance standard under Rule 401 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. The concept that appears to emerge from the cases is that
depending on the circumstances of each case, evidence of occupation may be probative,
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but is not determinative, on the issue of acquiescence.
Evidence of mere occupation cannot be definitive proof of acquiescence by a
landowner because under the Doctrine, the two elements are separate and distinct. And,
it is clear that a plaintiff has the burden of proving all four elements of her claim. To
hold otherwise would merge the first two elements of the Doctrine, occupation up to a
visible line into the third, acquiescence in the line as a boundary. If this were the case,
by proving mere occupancy, the acquiescence element would be satisfied. To prevail, all
a plaintiff would have to do would be to prove, 1) occupancy up to a visible line, 2) by
adjoining landowners, 3) for a long period of time. Such a holding would be a
substantial departure from Hales, where this Court stated:
Where there is no proof of acquiescence in the line as the
boundary, there can be no boundary by acquiescence. And a
failure to meet any one of the elements of the doctrine defeats
the boundary.
Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559 (emphasis in original). Importantly, under this strained analysis,
the element that a plaintiff would no longer be required to prove would be the element
that forms the very core of the doctrine: acquiescence. Furthermore, to allow the
application of the Doctrine without separate proof of acquiescence would broaden the
application of the Doctrine substantially by making the plaintiffs case much easier to
prove. Needless to say, this would completely reverse the course of the jurisprudence in
the Doctrine, which "has always been restrictively applied in Utah. v Staker, 785 P. 2d at
423.
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b.

At a Minimum, Allowing Acquiescence Based Upon Mere
Occupation Creates an Improper Presumption Against the Record
Title Owner.

An analysis that allows acquiescence to be inferred from the fact of mere
occupation would effectively create an impermissible presumption against the record title
owner that he or she has acquiesced. This is because upon a showing of occupation, the
record title owner would be required to disprove acquiescence. As noted, such an
analysis is inconsistent with this Court's statement in Hales which requires proof of each
element of the Doctrine. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559. When placed into operation,
inferring acquiescence from occupation only would incorrectly raise a presumption in
favor of a plaintiff and against a defendant landowner that the defendant landowner has
acquiesced in the line as the boundary. This is the case even though as noted, it is the
defendant's rights that are afforded constitutional protection/
Also, to place a burden on a landowner to disprove intent to recognize the line as
the boundary on a showing of occupation only is inconsistent with the demands of the
Due Process Clause of the Utah and the United States Constitutions. Both clauses
demand that a litigant who wishes to deprive a citizen of real property must bear the
burden of proving each element of his case by clear and convincing evidence. Stated

3

This Court may have alluded to this burden-shifting in Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d at 789
("Record property owners are not required to take legal action or otherwise "oust"
someone adversely occupying their property to maintain legal rights in their property.
They must only take some action manifesting that they do not acquiesce or recognize the
particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the properties. ")(Internal citations and
punctuation omitted). In view of the constitutional protections afforded real property
interests, and the confusion within the Doctrine, Appellant respectfully suggests that any
such burden shifting cannot be a correct statement of the law.
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another way, the due process clauses of both constitutions demand that a court start with
a presumption against the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then overcome this presumption
by proving each element of his or her case by clear and convincing evidence. A
defendant landowner, as the holder of a constitutionally protected real property interest
should not be made to shoulder any such burden. The plaintiff, as the party seeking to
deprive the defendant landowner of a constitutionally protected interest, must retain the
burden. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Kay's predecessors occupied to the fence.
The critical question, however, is why they did so. The only fact in the record upon
which the District Court relied in answering this question is the fact of mere occupation.
That being the case, the record is devoid of evidence as to why Kay's predecessors
occupied only to the fence. Accordingly and based upon the record before the trial court,
the only way to conclude that Kay's predecessors subjectively intended to recognize the
fence as the boundary is to infer their subjective intent to recognize the fence as the
boundary from the fact of mere occupation. Considering the nature of the properly
interest at stake, such an inference or presumption is improper under the Utah
Constitution and the United States Constitution.

4

While the District Court cited Tom and Dale's opinion regarding the boundary, that
evidence was not factual; it was lay opinion testimony, the sole foundation of which was
their observation of occupation of the property up to the fence. Thus, the sole fact upon
which the District Court's conclusion of acquiescence rests is the undisputed fact that
both parties and their predecessors merely occupied up to the fence.
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c.

To Establish Acquiescence, More Than Mere Occupancy Is
Required.

The factual basis for finding intent, or the lack of intent, to recognize a line as a
boundary will usually take the form of affirmative acts or statements from which intent,
or lack thereof, may be inferred. Previously noted examples are found in Staker and
Ault. Additionally, certain aspects of the law of easements are illustrative of how intent
may be inferred from the acts of property owners. By analogy, these cases illustrate that
more than mere occupancy must be required to prove intent to recognize a line as a
boundary.
As discussed in greater detail below, the law of abandonment of easements, in
which the easements are based upon instruments of conveyance, is instructive in this case
because the circumstances and considerations therein are highly analogous to the
circumstances and considerations in boundary by acquiescence cases. Both involve the
judicial divesture of a vested real property interest. The principal distinction between
abandonment of easements and boundary by acquiescence is that boundary by
acquiescence involves a divestiture of fee title, as opposed to the divestiture of a
servitude as occurs in abandonment of easements. In both instances, the judicial power is
employed to divest an owner of her real property interest based on the owner's conduct,
as opposed to the more conventional means of conveyancing of real property interests
through written recorded instruments. Both the law of abandonment of easements and
boundary by acquiescence demand the clear and convincing standard because the
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doctrmes attack the validity of written recorded instruments and deprive properly vested
real property interest holders of their constitutionally protected property interests.
Because abandonment of easements and boundary by acquiescence are
conceptually so similar, the analytical structure this Court has established in
abandonment of easements is helpful to an understanding of the factors to be taken into
consideration before divesting an owner of fee title in boundary by acquiescence cases.
Of particular importance in both cases is the inference of subjective intent based on the
conduct of the owner of the real property interest. For example, if an owner of an
easement blocks it or renders the easement unusable, or takes other actions consistent
with the intent to abandon the easement, that can be evidence of an intent to abandon.
Brown v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, 102 P. 740, 742 Utah 1909. There is no
principled reason not to impose this same requirement when fee title is at issue by
requiring courts to look to affirmative acts in boundary by acquiescence cases as the
Court ofAppeals did in Argylev.

Jones, 118 P. 3d 301, 305 (Utah App. 2005). If, for

example, the fee owner allows the adjoining landowner to build a permanent structure on
the fee owner's property without objection, as in Staker, that is evidence of intent to
recognize the line as a boundary. This Court has previously hinted at such a rule, stating
that merely allowing someone else to occupy your land is not sufficient to establish
acquiescence in boundary cases. Hales, 600 P.2d at 599.
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d.

Evidence of Mere Occupation Fails To Satisfy The Cleai " and
Convincing Standard Required in Boundary by Acquiescence
Cases.
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and maintain a pipeline for irrigation purposes with the right of ingress and egress along
said line." Id. at 789. In this regard, the perpetual grant in Riter is similar to the
conveyance of fee title to Appellant Kay. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 615
(1990) (Defining fee simple title as being "unlimited as to duration, disposition, and
descendibility."). In Riter, the plaintiff claimed that the easement had been abandoned
because the defendant had discontinued its use. Riter, 431 P. 2d at 789. In holding that
there had not been an abandonment, this Court stated:
This easement is a right in land evidenced by a written conveyance,
duly recorded. The right so conveyed could be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence. And this must not be of mere non-use
of the easement, but of the intention of the owner to abandon it.
Id., internal citations omitted.
A similar conclusion was reached by this Court ten years later in Western Gateway
Storage v. Tresdeder, 567 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). Much like Appellant Kay's fee title in
this case, in Western Gateway the right of way at issue had been acquired by a series of
conveyances dating from 1909, all of which had been recorded. The plaintiff claimed
that the right of way had been lost through non-use. In addressing that question, this
Court stated:
It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be
abandoned. However, to determine the issue of abandonment
several factors need be considered among which [is] . . . the
actual intent of the owner. This court has previously recognized
that a right gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use
alone and that an actual intent to abandon [must] be evident.
*

*

s|e

In regard to the quantum of proof required on the issue of abandonment, it [has been] determined that the degree of proof required [is]
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that of clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and right
of use and an intentional abandonment, not a mere preponderance of
the evidence.
.
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mn^iii!1
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owner of the dominant estate of his easement. Consistently, Appellant respectfully
submits that mere occupation of one's property by another is not sufficient to divest her

Second, evidence of intent to abandon an easement is required. Appellant respectfi illy
suggests that if evidence of intent is required to divest an easement owner of his
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servitude, which by definition is a lesser interest than fee simple, the same degree of
evidence should be required to divest an owner of fee title. Third, evidence of intent may
be proven through affirmative acts, of either the owner of the dominant or the servient
estate. In the context of boundary by acquiescence, this is consistent with the holdings in
Stoker and the language in Argyle, which requires "affirmative acts" to prove an intent to
recognize a line as the boundary. Fourth and finally, the burden of proof in abandonment
of easement cases is clear and convincing. It is difficult to understand why, if clear and
convincing evidence is required to divest an owner of a servitude, clear and convincing
evidence would not also be required to divest an owner of fee title. Moreover, a clear
and convincing standard is not only consistent with the law of abandonment of
easements, it is consistent with a spectrum of cases and doctrines involving constitutional
considerations, as noted above.
5.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING KAY'S MOTION AND
GRANTING EBF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The present appeal arises out of the Trial Court's decision granting EBF's motion

for summary judgment and denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment. That
being the case, the Trial Court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
EBF and against Kay for purposes of Kay's motion, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of Kay and against EBF for purposes of EBF's motion. To keep the analysis clear,
the motions are addressed separately below.
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a. EBF's Motion for Summary Judgment.
For purposes of EBF's motion, this Court views the facts in the light most
!•. v : i\,i\ afavor. Thurnwaldv. A.R,

. . .

-!;..-•

^asoiiaoic mierences in nr>

2007 UT 38, H 5, 163 P.3d 623, 62:>. M i . - -

.h.r-.h-, HI = V

the allegation that his predecessors acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. I he
remaining elements are undisputed. I hus, the narrow question posed here is whether the
iintlispiiled l;u I1, in llu1 ivcoid and Ihe reasonable inferences io be drawn tlu'it Imni in
favor of Kay, prove by clear and convincing evidence, that Kay's predecessors
acquiesced in the fence as the boimdary and therefore, that EBF is entitled to judgment as
i mallei' of law
As the District Court noted, the only evidence from which acquiescence by Kay's
predecessors could be inferred is the testimony of Tom and Dale Fowkes. R. 11 7.
Simply put, Tom amJ

•. .

* me-ocu Kay's predecessors occupy the

land up to, but not beyond the fence. Speuiicalh "H1 1 • - v!>iu w r<,<- ;w\ .-.I

x

v

was their "understanding" of the location of the boundary based upon theii "experience
with the property" ' K. 2 > \ lioth answered that tu^ed upon their experience with the
j)i \ ;j ; c i i y , LI K y iit H n i >»u u u i 11 u

n in t

-" "

"

>•>"••'

" \

understanding was derived only from their observations of occupation up to the fence

Kay again notes that Tom and Dale's "understanding" is a belief or an opinion. Kav
submits that under these facts, Tom and Dales' beliefs are not evidence of the
predecessors' intent if only because one person's "beliefs" are not evidence ot another's
intent. And, even within the same individual a belief and intent are different. A belie! is
an opinion that can be wrong while intent is a fact that may be proven with app'-opn'-ur
evidence.
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line. Both testified that there had never been any discussion, by any party, at any time,
concerning a boundary, or the fence as a boundary. R. 226, 227-228, 297. There is no
evidence that either had been directed or authorized by any Kay predecessor to take any
action, or inaction, that would indicate that the fence was the boundary. Accordingly,
this is the only testimony from any of Kay's predecessors or their families that supports
the Trial Court's conclusion of acquiescence by Kay's predecessors in title.
Hence, there is no evidence anywhere in the record that indicates that Kay's
predecessors intended the fence to be the boundary. The only evidence is the testimony
of Tom and Dale, who are not predecessors in Kay's title. Importantly and as noted,
their testimony was based upon their "experience with the property." R. 234. That is,
working the land and occupying only up to the fence line. Thus, the sole fact that comes
to this case by way of Tom and Dale's testimony is the fact that Kay's predecessors
occupied up to, but not beyond the fence. Stated otherwise, the evidence in this case
shows occupation only. There is no other evidence from which to infer the subjective
intent of Kay's predecessor's to recognize the fence as a boundary.
i.

When Construed Most Favorably Toward Kay and
Against EBF, The Inference To Be Drawn From Mere
Occupation Is That Kay's Predecessors Did Not
Acquiesce.

The fact of occupation can give rise to an inference of acquiescence. See Staker,
785 P. 2d at 420-21. However, an inference of acquiescence does not necessarily follow
from the fact of occupation. Indeed, there is Utah case law that suggests that mere
occupation without more does not establish acquiescence. Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559
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("[P]laintiffs occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient to establish
defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a b«niiular\ ") Therefore, viewing the evidence
i

-. ji-iu -no-t ia\ niiihu i.--\.i;, -li'.! '•: . w± M\ caMHiark inferences in im> iavui.

entirely plausible that the subjective inteiit of Kay's predecessors was not to recc>gihze
the fence as the boundary. The only feet that even suggests the intent of Kay's
predecessors is the tact ot mere occupation. But under i .tali law, occupation may or may
not si iggest acqi liescei ice. Ir i tl ic posti it e of EBF's i i lotion, it! le I )isti ict Coi n I: v 'as
required to draw whatever inferences may be inferred from the facts in Kay's favor, ihat
required the District Court to infer that mere occupation by Kay's predecessors did not
SUggCSt

.

'C'.;-i*!H\

.r* :* !

••!.•!»: .

;

indicate that the intent of Kay's predecessors was to recognize the fence as the boundary.
It was therefore error to conclude that EBF was enlillcd to judgment as a matter of law.
ii.

AG
»u-i ence To Be Drawn ¥rorn Mere
Occupation ^ii.»v\s That Kay's Predecessors Did Not
Acquiesce In 1 !u- !*>nce as a Boundary.

In addition, a more plausible explanation exists as to why Kay's predecessors
occupied only up to the fence. The mere occupation to whicu !'nm and I >ale testified
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inconvenience, lack of resources to move the fence or, ni view of the nature of the
agricultural use of the laud and lis relatively small size, a cost-benefit analysis indicating
tl tat i elocating tl le fei ice was i lot ^ \ ortl i tl ic .tii i i : ai id : f fc i t Ii I ' ie , * ' of tl i s I i lii lin lal
amount of land involved, and the agricultural use of the same, Kay's predecessors may
have concluded that moving the fence was ilot worth the expense under the
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circumstances.

None of these alternative reasons suggest that the predecessors intended

the fence to be the boundary. Indeed, based upon a cost/benefit analysis, the expense of
relocating 2700 feet offence may not have been worth the benefit to Kay's predecessors'
cattle and farming operations in obtaining only a maximum of 130 feet. In the posture of
Kay's motion, the District Court was required to construe this fact and the inference
drawn therefrom in favor of Kay. When this is done, the reasonable inference drawn
from this undisputed fact shows that Kay's predecessors' occupation up to the fence was
not a consequence of their intent to recognize the fence as a boundary, but rather that
there was no meaningful benefit in doing otherwise. That being the case, the district
court erred by not drawing this inference in Kay's favor, and therefore erred in ruling that
EBF was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In the purest sense of the word, perhaps these alternative inferences of convenience,
inconvenience, lack of resources, etc., derived from the fact of mere occupation suggest
"acquiescence" based upon inaction. This is why a workable definition thai focuses on
the intent of the landowner would be helpful in reducing the confusion in the Doctrine.
Each of the above alternative inferences to be drawn from mere occupation might suggest
that, through inaction, an owner has "abandoned" her real properly interest. However,
ownership of fee title cannot be abandoned. Cristofani v. Board of Education of Prince
Georges County, 632 A. 2d 447 (Md. App. 1993). As explained in Turk v. Wilson's
Heirs, 98 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. App. 1936),
By virtue of section 470, Ky. Stats (the statute of frauds), there is but one
way for a man to part with a vested title to real estate, and that is by a writing
signed by him. A vested fee-simple title to real estate cannot be abandoned.
If a man should go away and leave it for forty, fifty, or any other number of
years, and no one should seize and occupy the property adversely, or should
it not be sold for taxes, the returning owner would perhaps find his property
grown up with saplings and bushes, but he would find his title unimpaired.
This is consistent with Utah's Statute of Frauds, U.C.A. § 25-1-1 et seq.
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b. Kay's Motion for Sumiuat \ T igment.
Mr. Kay's motion is subject to the same requirement that the District Court view
t :i .

IKIK-
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-' • a !a\ IM ti ... .

.ii.ii'!''- .-

:. .,\ .a: reuMMianic imerences

in favor of EBF. Id, 1hat being the case, for pi irposes of Appellant's motioi1, the Trial
Court was required to infer that occupation is, on some level, evidence of acquiescence.
i.

r

liK h.
f

1 o lii Ui A** n 1 f oiu Mere Occupation Is
i and <^>if:tlif\ of I \ irience Necessary to

For purposes of Kay's motion, the only evidence of acquiescence is the inference
drawn from the fact of mere occupation. That is, in the posture of Kay's motion for
si n i i! riai y ji idgi i lent , tl t s I i Iail ( 'c i n t * vra,i;; i eqi iii e d to ii lie: i tl lat tl: le fact of n lere occi lpatioi i
by Kay's predecessors indicated, on some level, that they subjectively intended to
recognize the fence as a boundary. The dispositive question on this motion is whether
tin-. aiiLMc inference, oascu upi':.

MIOIC

occiipai

:-.MI -UH\,

. is ;-i me quantum aiui quality of

evidence that justifies a taking of a real nmrvr!* i! : • ' T

»*•»;, • *'

: i i-»

;

,'

United States Constitutions. Put another w i \ : Does the inference of acquiescence the
Trial Coiirt was required to draw from this evidence satisfy the clear and convincing

again in yet another form: Does this inference give the fact finder the degree of
confidence in concluding that Kay's predecessors acquiesced in the fence as a boundary;
tl lat 3i it societ; ; 1:1 linl cs it si IC i lid 1 lave before a coi n t di/v ests a pi opei ty o vv i ler of 1 lis
constitutionally protected fee title?
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The answer to these questions is "no". This is because the inference drawn from
mere occupation is simply too tenuous and inconclusive to be clear and convincing.
While mere occupation may suggest acquiescence, it does not compel the mind to
conclude that Kay's predecessors occupied up to the fence because they intended it to be
the boundary. As stated above, the clear and convincing standard requires a plaintiff to
prove his or her case to the point that no serious or substantial doubt remains regarding
the truth of his or her assertions. See MUJI 2d CV118 Clear and Convincing Evidence.
As stated in Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949):
That proof is convincing which carries with it, not only the power to
persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or
correctness. Clear and convincing evidence clinches what might be
otherwise only probable to the mind.
While the fact that Kay's predecessors occupied only to the fence may suggest or
"make probable to the mind" that they intended to recognize the fence as a boundary, the
dispositive question is this: Does the fact that Kay's predecessors occupied up to the
fence "clinch" in the mind that the predecessors had the subjective intended to recognize
the fence as a boundary? The answer to this question is also "no". In view of its tenuous
and inconclusive nature, the inference drawn from mere occupation is not the quality or
quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the clear and convincing standard or that will
pass constitutional muster.
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ii. As a Matter of Law, Mere < h* upation Cannot Establish the
Acqueiscence Elemeni Because Such \n \ utlv sis W ouhf
Merge Two Elements of the Doctrine of Boundary By
Acqiliescence ' n i t i Ov*\
Also, as a i i latter of law , i t let e occi ipation i ip to a fei ice does not establish
acquiescence.

iC

[T]he plaintiffs occupation up to the fence without interference was not

sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as the boundary." Hales,
600 1 • 2d at 559

Gh >m 11 - H 'hitney \ 209 P 2d 257. 260 ("I li; il :t II9 ! 9) ( ''Ill"I ]I le • I i i c r e f« tct

that a fence happens to be put up and neither parlv does anythiim about it for a long
period of time will not establish it as the true boundaiy. ) li was therefore error for the
1i ial Coiirt to coikiuk: mm mere occupation estak: .ik-.i acquiescence as a manor oi law.
This is because if a court was to hold that evidence of mere i\ , up.ii .

•.•. •

acquiescence, as a matter of law, the first element (occupation) and second element (up to
a visible line) of the Doctrine would he merged into the unrd (.acquiescence). As noted
ab< iX < •
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, i . ii
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boundary by acquiescence and results in the omission of proof of the most important
element of all: acquiescence.
v o >. LUSION
In light of the importance of real property rights in our society, serious or
substantial doiibt remains as to whether Kay's predecessors acquiesced in the fence as a
1

• -i

\i • •••:*'';:•'

•• • \

e - u u Mii'ge^ ii ig acquiescence, even the

most favorable inference of acquiescence drawn from these facts leaves ample room 'or
alternative explanations thereby rendering it insufficient to satisfy the clear and
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convincing standard. The evidence in this case is not the quantum and quality of
evidence courts should require for a taking of fee title to real property. Real property
rights are constitutionally protected and should not be so lightly disregarded. The clear
and convincing standard is simply too high to be overcome by so little evidence. A
litigant who wishes to take a constitutionally protected interest from another under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence must present something in addition to the mere
occupation shown in this case in order to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence
standard.
Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting EBF's motion for summary
judgment and in denying Mr.Kay's motion for summary judgment. This Court should
reverse that judgment and order summary judgment be entered in favor of Mr. Kay and
against Appellee.
DATED this /O

day of March, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,

4<V>Ut

GERMAN C. YOUNG
Attorney for Appellant StevenL. Kay
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Al r>F.MI)UM
EXHIBIT A

rSLBO
UTAH

APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 1 9 2010
SHERMAN <'. ^ OLNC i.WH i
DALLAS B. Y( »UNG (12405)
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 N= ••;•!!!
P.O. Box 657
Provo,UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
Facsimile: (80 h -5-3067
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Steven L. Kay
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

CERTIFICATE
OF
HAND
DELIVERY

vs.
* ll *

Defendant ana Appellant.

Trial Court No. 20090922

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I ?ih da\ of March. 2010. I caused u> be sen ed b\ hand
delivery two (2) true and correct copies of .... .. K : • ? •'

I

the Joih- i \i r ;'':

H. Burt Ringwood
STRONG &HANNI
3 Triad Center
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, I T\ 84180-1125
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Essential Botanical Farms, LC
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SHERMAN C. YOI
Attorney for DefendaM/Appellant
Steven L. Kay
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT B

WARRANTY DEED

U U L 0 J 0 1 7 6k 0466 pg m \
CRAIG J . SPERRY, JUAB COUNTY RECORDER
2004 JUN 30 13:46 PH FEE $11.00 8V SIC
FOR: JUAB TITLE t ABSTRACT COttPAHY

DARYL H. STANLEY and OLIVE F. STANLEY, as Trustees of the STANLEY FAMILY
TRUST U/A/D May 8, 1995, Grantors, of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to STEVEN L.
KAY, Grantee, of 150 North Draper Lane, Provo, UT 84601-2350 for the sum of Ten Dollars
($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in Juab County,
State of Utah, to-wit:
Parcel No, XB-1433-1: Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter
of the Northwest quarter of Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, thence South 160 rods to the Southeast corner of the North half of the
Southwest quarter of said Section 4, thence West 50,25 rods to a point 51.2 rods
East of the East boundary of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 91, thence North 100
rods to a point on the East boundary of the right-of-way of said U.S. Highway 91,
thence Northerly on said East boundary of said highway to a point due West of the
point of beginning, thence East 24.57 rods, more or less, to the point of beginning.
Together with all improvements thereon and anywise appertaining thereto.
Subject to easements, rights, restrictions, rights-of-way, conditions, covenants, reservations,
currently of record or enforceable in law or equity and subject to current general property taxes.
WITNESS THE HANDS of said Grantors this 23rd day of June, A.D. 2004.

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.

COUNTY OF JUAB

)

On the 23rd day of June, A.D. 2004, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah, Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as Trustees of the Stanley Family Trust U/A/D
May 8, 1995, the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the
same pursuant to and in accordance with powers vested in them by the terms of said trust agreement.
MARY LOU SPERRY
/ < ^ \
r
-: - ^ 8 ^ . K mY PUBLIC'SmoHJTfM

\\ >?&i
f') (& S 400 N. • POB 246
W / V ^ y ; V NEPHi, UTAH 84648

X < ^

^S

C0MM. EXP, 6-15-2006

JUAB TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY
wwwjuabtitle.com
240 North Main P. O. Box 246 Nephi, Utah 84648
(435) 623-0387 Order No. 22693.

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT C

HM7,
R. DELOS ANDREWS and MAX1NE D. ANDREWS, ELDON VERNESS ANDREWS and
ELIZABETH G. ANDREWS, NELDON V. ANDREWS also known as NELDON ANDREWS and
ANNA LEE ANDREWS and ORAL CALVERT TAYLOR and LA VEDA ANDREWS TAYLOR also
known as LAVEDA A. TAYLOR, MORGAN V. ANDREWS and JANET ANDREWS, SHIRLEY
PITTS and RICHARD PITTS, Grantors, of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT against all
claiming by, through or under Grantors, but not otherwise to ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC,
a Utah limited liability company, Grantee, of 250 South Main, Payson, Utah 84651 for the sum of
Ten Dollars ($10 00) and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tracts of land
in Juab County, State of Utah, to-wit
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
For the consideration recited above, Grantors hereby convey and assign to Grantee, without
warranties of title, all water rights, claims, applications and shares appurtenant to or used to provide
water for use on the foregoing lands, whether approved or unapproved, and whether evidenced by
certificates of appropriation, applications for appropriation, water user's claims, decrees, orders, permits,
contracts, leases, change applications, exchange applications, or shares in water or irrigation companies,
and together with all easements, ditches, canals, facilities, wells, pumps, pipelines and other equipment
used for the development or use of the same, including, without limitation, the water rights described in
Exhibit "B" attached hereto and made a part hereof
WITNESS THE HANDS of said Grantors this J2ih day of March, A D 1998

R Delos Andrews

Oral Calvert Taylor

^

Maxine D Andrews

Laveda Andrews Taylor also known^s
Laveda A Taylor

Eidon Verness Andrews

Morgan *V Andrews

4rz2_

anet/Andrews

Elizabeth G. Andrews

Neldon V Andrews also known as Neldon Andrews

Smrley Pitts

Anna Lee Andrews

Richard Puts

^~.

w

0 0 2 1 2 7 15

FiriJSl

«r»AIG J . SFFRRr JUAP COUllTV FUU&rE'n
1993 MAR 13 ii9:71 AH FEE
« n . i ' t i p) DrZ
FOR: JUAC TTTLE t ABSTRACl iQMFANr

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF JUAB

PnH3S>l

)

On the 12th day of March, A D 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah, R DELOS ANDREWS and MAXINE D ANDREWS, ELDON VERNESS
ANDREWS and ELIZABETH G ANDREWS, NELDON V ANDREWS also known as NELDON
ANDREWS and ANNA LEE ANDREWS and ORAL CALVERT TAYLOR and LAVEDA ANDREWS
TAYLOR also known as LAVEDA A TAYLOR, MORGAN V ANDREWS and JANET ANDREWS,
SHIRLEY PITTS and RICHARD PITTS, the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that they executed the same.

Notary Pi/Slic

JUAB TITLE & AHSTRACI COMPANY
240 North Mam I\ O. Box 246 Ncphi, Utah 84648
(80!) 623-0387 Order No. 14691.

ltfr)\

EXHIBIT "A"
Parcel XB 1421-1:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Southeast quarter of Section 33, Township 10
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1428-21:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Southeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1428-32:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: The North half of the Northeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1428-41:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: The North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11
South, Range 1 East', Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1428-61:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Northeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1458-1:

Beginning where old U.S. Highway 91 crosses the South line of the Northeast quarter
of Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 4000
feet, more or less, to (he East line of reservoir, thence North 18°03' East 73.7 feet,
thence North 12°38' East 122.9 feet, thence North 33°11' West 104.3 feet, thence North
14°31' East 100 feet, thence North 82°36' East 158.8 feet, thence South 68°04' East 119
feet, thence North 38° 12; East 50 feet, thence North 68°27' Wes! 122 feet, thence North
21°27' West 150.5 feel, thence North 7° 12' East 170 feet, thence North 50°48' East 78
feet, thence North 88°50' East 179 feet, thence North 80°2r East 255.9 feet, thence
South 86°21' East 73.6 feet, thence North 41°44' East 101.9 feet, thence South 66°29'
East 72.4 feet, thence South 87°57' East 108.8 feet, thence North 02°31' West 88.6 feet,
thence North 36°05' East 158.5 feet, thence North 57°4T East 117 feet, thence North
24°34' East 171.9 feet, thence North 54°06' West 60.9 feet, thence North 18°37' East
114 feet, thence North 0°27' East 202 feet, thence North 2°00' East 228.8 feet, thence
North 59°15' West 215.6 feet, thence North 49°41' West 200.7 feet, thence North
81°08' West 123.2 feet, thence South 76°20' West 186.9 feet, thence South 63°55' West
266 feet, thence South 74°14' West 121.9 feet, thence North 77°53' West 173 feet,
thence South 79°31' West 278.8 feet, thence North 38°29' West 120.8 feet, thence North
4 0 2 1 ' East 168.6 feet, thence North 42°20' East 222.4 feet, thence North 2° 14' East
263.5 feet to the North boundary of Section 8, thence South 89°52/ East 317 feet, thence
South 63°34' East 150.1 feet, thence North 78° 19' East 398 feet, thence|East 1232.4
feet, thence South 40 rods, thence East 160 rods, more or less, to the West side of old
U.S. Highway 91, thence Southwesterly along said highway to the place of beginning.

Parcel XB 1458-31:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 60 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9,
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence
South 60 rods, thence West 325 rods, more or less, to the East side of State Highway,
thence Northeasterly along the East side of said Slate Highway 63 rods, more or less, to
a point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 5 rods, more or les.s, to the place
of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township II South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake

Continuation of EXHIBIT "A"
Parcel XB 1458-22:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 652.5 feet South of the Northwest corner of Section 9,
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 65.2 feet, thence
North 22°30' East 706.3 feet to the North boundary line of said Section 9, thence East
4944.5 feet to the Northeast corner of said Section 9, thence South 60 rods, thence West
325 rods, more or less, to the East side of old U.S. Highway 91, thence Northeasterly
along the East side of said highway to the place of beginning.

Parcel XB 1458-41:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 120 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9,
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence
South 60 rods, thence West 345 rods, more or less, to the East side of the State
Highway, thence Northeasterly along the East side of said State Highway 63 rods, more
or less, to a point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 25 rods, more or less,
to the place of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State Road Commission
in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1463:

Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of
Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 1104 feet,
thence North 52°51' East 98 feet, thence North 48°24' West 186 feet, thence North
2°50' East 100 feet, thence North 49°07' East 400 feet, thence North 11°17' East 300
feet, thence North 60°04' East 186 feet, thence North 26°06' East 270 feet, thence North
1°27' East 194 feet, thence East 520 feet, thence South 1320 feet to the place of
beginning.
Also the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, the Northwest quarter of the
Southeast quarter and that part of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, which lies West of old
U.S. Highway 91. excepting the part thereof deeded to the Railroad in Book H, Page
372, in Book 10, Page 233, in Book 79, Page 510 and in Book 99, Page 32, of the
records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1463-21:

That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 180 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9,
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence
South 60 rods, thence West 365 rods, more or less, to the East side of State Highway,
thence Northeasterly along the East side of said Highway 63 rods, more or less, to a
point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 45 rods, more or less, to the place
of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian.

Parcel XB 1466-1:

Beginning at a point where the West boundary of the State Highway intersects the South
boundary of Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence
Northeasterly along the West boundary of said State Highway to the point of intersection
with the North boundary of the South half of the Southeast quarter of said Section 8,
thence West 175 rods, more or less, to the Northwest corner of the Southeast quarter of
the Southwest quarter of said Section 8, thence South 390 feet to the East side of the
Railroad right-of-way, thence Southwesterly along the right-of-way to the South boundary
line of said Section 8, thence East 175 rods, more or less, to the place of beginning.
Less 0.41 acre, more or less, conveyed to Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company,
in Book 307, Page 621, of the records of Juab County, Utah.

Parcel XB 1468-11:

That portion of the following described properly lying West of (he West line of 1-15
Freeway, to -vit: The South half of (he South half of Section 9, Township 11 South,

Continuation of EXHIBIT "A"
Parcel XB 1484:

Beginning at the Northeast comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 62 rods, more or less, to the
County Road, thence Southerly along the West side of County Road 40 rods, more or,
less, to the intersection of said road with the South line of the North half of the
Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 17, thence West 125 rods,
more or less, along said line to its intersection with the East line of the Northwest quarter
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 17, thence West 1320 feet to the West line of
said Section 17, thence North 40 rods along said Section line to the Northwest comer of
said Section 17, thence East 160 rods to the place of beginning.
Also that part of the following described tract which lies in the North half of the
Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, to-wit: Beginning at the Southeast comer of the Northeast
quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 18, thence West 892 feet, thence North
51°08' West 170 feet, thence North 21°55' East 345 feet, thence South 87°55' East 83
feet, thence North 15°30' East 205 feet, thence North 18°30' East 269 feet, thence North
28°12' East 435 feet, thence North 76°22' East 59 feet, thence South 73°38' East 335
feet, thence North 81°02' East 104 feet, thence North 58°06' West 251 feet to a point
on Section line between Sections 7 and 18, 204 feet West of the Southeast comer of
Section 7, thence East 204 feet to the Northeast corner of said Section 18, thence South
1320 feet to the place of beginning.

Parcel XB 1485:

The South half of the North half of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
Also beginning at the Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter
of said Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North
40 rods, thence East 45 rods, more or less, to the West side of County Road, thence
Southwesterly 41 rods, more or less, along the West side of County Road to a point on
the South line of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 17,
thence West 38 rods to the place of beginning.
Also that part of the following described tact which lies in the South half of the Northeast
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, to-wit: Beginning at the Southeast comer of the Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter of said Section 18, thence West 892 feet, thence North 51°08' West
170 feet, thence North 21 °55' East 345 feet, thence South 87°55' East 83 feet, thence
North 15°30' East 205 feet, thence North 18°30' East 269 feet, thence North 28° 12'
East 435 feet, thence North 76°22' East 59 feet, thence South 73°38' East 335 feet,
tlience North 81°02' East 104 feet, thence North 58°06' West 251 feet to a point on
Section line between Sections 7 and 18, 204 feet West of the Southeast comer of said
Section 7, tlience East 204 feet to the Northeast comer of said Section 18, thence South
1320 feet to the place of beginning.

Parcel XB 1486:

Beginning at the Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 30 rods, thence East 80 rods,
tlience South 30 rods, thence West 80 rods to the place of beginning.
Also beginning 60 rods West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South. Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
thence North 1.5 rods, (hence West 99 rods, thence North 45 rods, thence West 1 rod,
thence South 46.5 rods, thence East 100 rods to the place of beginning.
ft »n n t! n»»
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Continuation of EXHIBIT "A"
Parcel XB 1487-

Beginning 30 rods North or the Southwest corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 17,
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 50 rods, thence
East 80 rods, thence South 50 rods, thence West SO rods to the place of beginning
Excepting and excluding the following, to-wit Beginning at a point 50 rods North and
6 rods West from the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter
of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 11
rods, thence West 14 rods, thence South 11 rods, thence East 14 rods to the place of
beginning

Parcel XB 1488

Beginning at a point 50 rods North and 6 rods West from the Southeast corner of the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 11 rods, thence West 14 rods, thence South 11
rods, thence East 14 rods to the place of beginning

Parcel XB 1489

Beginning 48 5 rods West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 Cast, Salt Lake Meridian,
thence West 11 5 rods, thence North 1 5 rods, thence West 99 rods, thence North 45
rods, thence West 1 rod, thence North 33 5 rods, thence East 1315 rods, more or \essy
to the West side of the highway, thence Southerly along the West side of said highway
to the place of beginning

Parcel XB 1491

The Northwest quarter at the Southwest quarter ot Section 17, Township 11 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian

Parcel XB 1513

Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 7, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, thence West 204 feet, thence North 58°57' West 140 feet, thence North
37°20' West 256 feet, thence North 43°40' East 304 feet, thence North 5°00' East 193
feet, thence North 48°27' East 109 feet, thence North 29°00' East 341 feet to the East
line ol said Section 7, thence North 63°46' East 203 feet, thence North 52°51' East 47
feet, thence East 1104 feet on the North line of the Southwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter ol Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence
South 390 feet on the East line of said Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of said
Section 8 to the railroad right of way, thence Southwesterly along said right of-way to
a point on the South line of said Section 8, thence West along said Section 8 line to the
place of beginning

Parcel XB 1514

Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 1196 feet, thence North 38°08'
West 95 feet, thence North H°Q6' East 172 feet, thence North 24°37 r East 306 feet,
thence North 7°38 / West 547 feet, thence North 67°28' East 243 feet, thence North
19°42' East 175 feet, thence North 51 °08' West 20 feet, thence East S99 feet to the East
line of said quarter Section, thence South 1320 feet to the place of beginning
-o o 0-0-

B eQ2 1 2 7 1

Pi

1~^ 1

EXHIBIT E

Water Rignts ana Applications

1. 174 Shares of Norm Canyon Water.
2. Water Right No. 53-66. Appiicanon No. A21443, Certificate No. 5457,
for 6.0 cfs from underground water well; Priority: March 14, 1950.
3. Water Right No. 53-67. Appiicanon No. A21444T Certificate No. 6878,
for 6.0 cfs from underground water well; Priority: March 14, 1950.
4. Water Right No. 53-288. Appiicanon,No. U10637, for .045 cfs from
underground water well.
5. Water Right No. 53-289. Appiicanon No. U10638, for .045 cfs from
underground water weii.
6. Water Right No. 53-290. Application No. U10639, for .668 cfs from
underground water well.
7. Water Right No. 53-291, Application No. U10640, for .0011 cfs from
underground water well.
8. Water Right No. 53-292. Appiicanon No. U10641, for .045 cfs from
underground water well.
9. Water Right No. 53-293, Application No. U10642, for 2.228 cfs from
underground water well.

O 0 2 3 2* 7 1 ^

R> O 73 *? 1

P»~ U

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT D

IVIH!

|

4 £.uuu

O V A l r' ? P I N
aYUL^v..

THE F 0 U R T H

JUAB

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTA$g |-.:.v | ;, f ;•;

ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a
Utah limited liability company,

0*

RULING AND ORDER ON CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT
STEVEN L. KAY'S MOTION TO
STRIKE

Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN L KAY, an individual; JOHN DOES
AND ENTITIES 1-10,

Civil No. 050600068
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.

Defendants.

STEVEN L. KAY, an individual,
Counterclaim-Plaintiff,
v.
ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a
Utah limited liability company,
Counterclaim-Defendant.

Essential Botanical Farms ("EBF") and Steven L. Kay filed cross motions for partial
summary judgment m a real property boundary dispute.
EBF filed a motion for paitial summary judgment with a supporting memorandum on
September 17, 2007 (ctEBF First SJ Mem."). On October 22, 2007, Kay filed a motion to strike
Paragraphs 17 and 25 of EBF's Statement of Undisputed and Material Facts (located in EBF First
Mem. at iii-xix) with a supporting memorandum ("Kay Strike Mem."). On October 25, 2007, Kay
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a memorandum serving to both support his crossmotion and to respond to EBF's motion (titled Defendant Steven L. Kay's Combined Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Kay First S J Mem.")). On November 28, 2007, EBF
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("EBF Second
SJ Mem.") along with a memorandum in opposition to Kay's motion to strike ("EBF Mem. Opp'n
to Strike"). Kayfiledreply memoranda in support of his cross-motion for paitial summary judgment
1

and motion to strike on January 4, 2008 ("Kay Second SJ Mem." and "Kay Reply Strike Mem.").
The Court received oral arguments on the motions on March 13,200 8. See Docket. Having reviewed
and carefully considered the evidence and arguments submitted by counsel, the Court makes the
following ruling and order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties' Properties and Location of the Original Fence
1.
This case involves property located in Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 4"), located in the Mona Valley, near Mona, Utah. (Affidavit
of Steven L. Kay ["Kay Affidavit"], at 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 5 1fl[ 1-2; EBF Second SJ Mem. at
in.)

2.
EBF holds fee-title ownership in certain real property (the "EBF Property") in Section
4. (EBF First SJ Mem. at iv ^| 3 (citing Special Warranty Deed recorded by the Juab County Recorder
on March 13, 1998, as Entry No. 00212715, in Book 0391, at Page 0181); Kay First SJ Mem. at 3
(not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts); id. at 5 ^ 1; EBF Second SJ Mem
at iii (not disputing Paragraph 1 of Kay's Statement of Additional Uncontested and Material Facts).)
3.
Kay owns certain real property (the "Kay Property") immediately adjacent to, and
located west of, the EBF Property. (EBF First SJ Mem. at iv ^| 4 (citing Warranty Deed recorded by
the Juab County Recorder on June 20, 2004, as Entry No. 00235619, in Book 0466, at Page 0641);
id. at 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3; Answer and Counterclaim at 5 \ 29 (stating EBF "owns propeity
immediately adjacent to Kay's propeity"); Reply to Counterclaim at 2 \ 29 ("EBF admits that it owns
property immediately adjacent to property purportedly owned by Kay."))
4.
The parties agree that the location of the original fence at issue in this action (the
"Original Fence") is reflected on a survey prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying,
signed on August 9,2004 (the "Survey"), and which is attached to EBF's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as Exhibit "A." See Affidavit of Stephen L. Ludlow (filed
Sept. 17,2007); EBF First SJ Mem. at iii \ 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16
of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts). The parties agree the Survey accurately reflects the locations of
fence lines that existed on the various properties at the time the Survey was conducted. Ludlow Aff.
f^4; EBF First SJ Mem. at iii \ 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of
Plaintiffs Statement of Facts).
B. The Partiesf Predecessors in Interest
1 The FoM>kes Family—Kay's Predecessors in Interest1
5.
The official records of Juab County, Utah, reflect that Kay's predecessors in interest
in the Kay Property include the following:
(a)
The Kay Property was conveyed by Thomas G. Fowkes and Lela Fowkes to
John L. Fowkes on or about March 27, 1937. At that point in time, the Kay Propeity included an
adjoining, triangular parcel of property that is now known as Parcel No. XB1433-21. EBF First SJ

1

Unless otherwise noted, the source of the material in Paragraph 5 and its subsections is EBF First SJ Mem.
at iv-v % 5. See also Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts).
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Mem. at iv f 5(a) (citing copy of Deed conveying the Kay Property to John L. Fowkes attached
thereto as Exhibit "D")(b)
Pursuant to the Order Approving First and Final Account and Decree of
Distribution recorded on or about November 23, 1959, the Kay Property was conveyed by L. Earl
Fowkes, the administrator of the Estate of John L. Fowkes, to Maud Fowkes, who was the wife of
John L. Fowkes. EBF First SJ Mem. at iv f 5(b) (citing copy of Decree of Distribution attached
thereto as Exhibit "E").
(c)
The Kay Property was later conveyed by Maud Fowkes to Blanch F. Cloward
(a daughter of John and Maud Fowkes) pursuant to a Declaration and Deed of Trust. EBF First SJ
Mem. at v Tf 5(c) (citing copy of Declaration and Deed of Trust attached thereto as Exhibit tcF"). As
reflected on the Declaration and Deed of Trust, John L. Fowkes died on December 14, 1957. See
also EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv K 1 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto
as Exhibit "A"). Maud Fowkes died on July 9,1965. EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv ^ 2 (citing Affidavit
of Karen W. Smith, dated Nov. 26, 2007, attached thereto as Exhibit "B")(d)
On February 24,1970, a Deed of Conveyance was recorded to convey the Kay
Property from Blanch F. Cloward to her sister Olive F. Stanley and Olive's husband, Daryl H.
Stanley. The Deed of Conveyance to the Stanleys did not include the adjoining, triangular parcel to
the west, which is now known as XB1433-21. EBF First SJ Mem. at v ^ 5(d) (citing copy of Deed
of Conveyance attached thereto as Exhibit "G")- Blanche F. Cloward died on October 9,1990. EBF
Second SJ Mem. at iv ^| 3 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto as Exhibit
"C")(e)
On May 22, 1995, the Kay Property was conveyed by Olive F. Stanley and
Daryl H. Stanley to Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as trustees of the Stanley Family Trust,
u/a/d May 8, 1995. EBF First SJ Mem. at v TJ 5(e) (citing copy of Warranty Deed attached thereto
as Exhibit "H").
(f)
On June 30, 2004, Olive F. Stanley and Daryl H. Stanley, as trustees of the
Stanley Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995, conveyed the Kay Property to Kay pursuant to the
Warranty Deed described in Paragraph 3 above. Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3,2005. EBF Second
SJ Mem. at iv % 4 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto as Exhibit "D")This date preceded the date EBF filed a reply to Kay's Counterclaim (filed on July 15, 2005) and
before the parties had met for the attorneys' planning meeting (held August 1,2005) and commenced
discovery in this action. (See Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and Case Management Order,
entered on October 13, 2005.)
2. The Andrews Family—EBF's Predecessors in Interesf
6.
The official records of Juab County, Utah, reflect that EBF's predecessors in interest
in the EBF Property include the following:
(a)
The EBF Property was conveyed by the State of Utah to John W. Roundy, Sr.
by a Quit Claim Deed recorded on September 19,1946. EBF Fiist SJ Mem. at vi ^ 6(a) (citing copy
of Quit Claim Deed attached thereto as Exhibit CT').

2

Unless otherwise noted, the source of the materia] in Paragraph 6 and its subsections is EBF First SJ Mem.
at iv-v f 6. See also Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts).
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(b)
John W. Roundy, Sr. and Mina M. Roundy conveyed the EBF Property to
Orvil Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews, R. Delos Andrews, and Eldon Verness Andrews by Wan'anty
Deed recorded on January 14, 1955. EBF First SJ Mem. at vi ^ 6(b) (citing copy of Warranty Deed
attached thereto as Exhibit CCJ").
(c)
By Warranty Deeds recorded on August 5,1955, Orville Andrews and Millie
D. Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews and Anna Lee Andrews, and R. Delos Andrews and Maxine D.
Andrews conveyed a portion of the EBF Property (including the Nortli lA of the Southeast % of
Section 4) to Eldon Verness Andrews. EBF First SJ Mem. at vi ^| 6(c) (citing copies of Warranty
Deeds attached thereto as Exhibit "K").
(d)
By Warranty Deed recorded on August 5, 1955, Orville Andrews and Millie
D. Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews and Anna Lee Andrews, R. Delos Andrews and Maxine D.
Andrews, and Eldon Verness Andrews conveyed a portion of the EBF Property (including the South
Vi of the Northeast % of Section 4) to Oral Calvert Taylor and Leveda A. Taylor. EBF First S J Mem.
at vi \ 6(d) (citing copy of Warranty Deeds attached thereto as Exhibit "L").
(e)
By Warranty Deed recorded on November 6, 1996, R. Delos Andrews, as
personal representative of the Estates of Orvil Andrews and Millie Jane Durfee Andrews, conveyed
the Estates5 interest in tire EBF Property to Laveda Andrews Taylor, Eldon Verness Andrews, R.
Delos Andrews, and Neldon Andrews. EBF First SJ Mem. at vii \ 6(e) (citing copy of Warranty
Deed attached thereto as Exhibit "M").
(f)
By the Special Warranty Deed described in Paragraph 2 above, tire EBF
Property was conveyed to EBF on March 13, 1998.
C. Testimony ofActivity on the West Side of the Fence3
L Deposition Testimony of Tom Fowkes
7.
Tom Fowkes is the son of Earl and Darlene Fowkes and the grandson of John L.
Fowkes (referred to in Paragraph 5(a) above). Tom Fowkes has lived at his family's home near
Mona, Utah, for 'just about 59 years," except for a short period of time when the family lived in
town. (Tom Fowkes Depo. at 4, 16.) Tom Fowkes was born in 1947. (Id. at 5.)
8.
Earl Fowkes, Tom's father, passed away several years ago, but Darlene still lives in
Mona. (Id. at 14.) Earl Fowkes started farming his family's property before 1947. (Id. at 34.)
9.
Earl Fowkes had three siblings: Olive, Blanche, and Lucille, none of whom
participated in farming activities on the family property. (Id at 14-15; 34.) Olive Stanley is the only
remaining living sister of Earl Fowkes. (Id. at 15.)
10.
Tom's brothers, Dale, Grant, and Glen, also farmed the family property. (Id. at 13.)
Tom's sister Nancy and brother Wayne "weren't much for farming." (Id.)

3

With the exception of Paragraphs 17 and 25, Kay expressly does not dispute the paragraphs below (up to
and including Paragraph 56), which the Court therefore reproduces from EBF's Memorandum in Support Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. See EBF First SJ Mem. at vii-xix ^ 7-56; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3-5; Kay Motion to
Strike at 2. The headings and editorial changes (marked by braces ({})) are the Court's own.
Because the Court denies Kay's motion to strike Paragraphs 17 and 25, see Part II.B. below, they are also
reproduced here.
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11
Also, Tom Fowkes testified that Daiyl and Olive Stanley "come down, you know,
when Gi andpa and Grandma [John and Maud Fowkes] wei e alive Outside of that—the visits would
have been spaise " (Id at 46-47 )
12
[omitted because not cleaily supported by cited portion of the iecoid}
13
The Fowkes family diy fanned their side of the Ongmal Fence (Id at 12 )
14
Tom Fowkes began fanning his family's property when he "was big enough to go"
with his father (Id at 12 ) He testified that "I know that so I wasn't veiy old when I started going
with Dad on the tractor and down to do cows and, you know, fuss aiound on the farm " (Id)
15
During the brief time that the Fowkes family lived m the town of Mona, Tom Fowkes
continued to woik on the family faim (Id at 17 )
16
The Fowkes family continued fanning activities on then piopeity until it was sold to
Kay (Id at24{ 25}, 47 ) Tom Fowkes himself fanned his family's pi opertyfiom his childhood until
"[u]p into the c70s, I would assume, maybe even latei than that " (Id at 25 )
17 4 Regarding the boundaiy between the pioperties at issue, Tom Fowkes testified as
follows
Q All light
Looking again at the sui vey, just based on your experience with the
property and working on the faim, where did you understand the boundaiy to be
between the properties we've been talking about9
Answei On the fencelme
(Id at 18)
18
The Original Fence was m existence when Tom Fowkes was bom (Id at 23 ) Tom
Fowkes fuithei testified that his family maintained the Ongmal Fence "on occasion " (Id at 45 )
19
Tom Fowkes had dealings with the Andiews family "as long as they weie heie " (Id
at 26)
2 Deposition Testimony of Dale Fowkes
20
Dale Fowkes, Tom's youngei brother, conducted farming activities on the family
property until it was sold to Kay (Deposition of Dale Fowkes ["Dale Fowkes Depo "] at
{16,}33-34{} ) {(Tom Fowkes Depo at 24-25 ))
21
Dale Fowkes testified that his family diyfaimed then property, lotating hay and giam,
with "the exception of once m awhile" when they weie able to "get the watei to come acioss " (Id
at 33 ) These fanning activities continued until the yeai 2001 (Id {at 34 })
22
In eaihei yeais, the Fowkes family ran livestock on then piopeity (Id at 35 )
23
Dale Fowkes fanned the family pioperty under a lease fiom Daryl and Olive Stanley
foi about ten yeais before the pioperty was sold to Kay {Id at 16-17 )
24
Dale Fowkes testified that the Original Fence was in existence when he was bom m
1949 (Id at 21)
25 5 Regai ding contact with the Andiews family and the boundaiy between the pioperties,
Dale Fowkes testified as follows

See supia note 3
See supra note 3

Q How much contact did you have with the—the Andrews?
A Quite a bit.
Q What kinds of—what kinds of contact would you have with the Andrews as you
were—
A: Oh—
Q: —working on the farm?
A: Oh, we traded machinery back and forth, you know, talked—talked fairly often.
I did work for them and they come and helped me at different times, you know? It's
just a—a neighborly situation.
Q: And what kind of work did you do for the Andrews?
A: Oh, I baled hay for them, trucked, cleaned ground for them. And, like I say, we
traded machinery back and forth at different times. And then just—just kind of a
social thing, you know, just as neighbors talk back and forth about different things.
When I was younger I worked for them, you know, when I was coming through
school and things like that.
Q: What did the Andrews do with their side of the—the property or their side of the
fence line?
A: When I was younger that—they—they planted some—they did a little dry land
work up there but that really wasn't their thing, so they planted the grass and run
livestock in there.
Q: Okay. Based on your experience with the—the property that we've been talking
about and you've testified today what was your understanding where the boundary
was between your family's property and the Andrews property?
A: The—fence—where the fence was.
Q: Did you ever speak with anyone in the Andrews family or others who owned that
property to the east about the boundary?
A: No.
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary was between the two
properties?
A: Not that I'm aware of.
(Id at 22-24.)
D. Testimony of Activity on the East Side of the Fence
1. Deposition Testimony ofEl don Verness Andrews
26.
As reflected in the Deed described in Paragraph 6(b) above, Eldon Verness Andrews
("Verness Andrews") was one of the owners of the EBF Property. Pursuant to the Deed described
in Paragraph 6(c) above, the Andrews family conveyed title to the North V2 of the Southeast lA of
Section 4 to Verness Andrews.
27.
Verness Andrews was involved with his family's business operations on the Andrews
property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 1998. (Id. at 36.)
28.
Verness Andews testified about his family's business on the east side of the Original
Fence as follows:
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Q. It appears that the deeds in Exhibits 2 or 3 were recorded on or about the same
date. Can you tell me why the property was conveyed initially to multiple people and
then—and divided after that?
A. We operated as a family unit. And when it was conveyed—I don't lcnow what
time—my father went to an attorney in Nephi and he deeded out different portions
to different ones of us. He felt that that's something that needed to be done.
Q. And although there were portions deeded out to different people, was the farming
operation on the entire parcel?
A. Yes. We, we operated as a partnership, family partnership.
Q. What was the name of the partnership?
A. Orvil Andrews and Sons. You'll find in the records, because it's a long title, we
wound up Andrews Brothers or various other names that was the official name, yeah.
(Deposition of Eldon Verness Andrews, June 8, 2007 ["Verness Andrews Depo."], at 9.)
29.
Verness Andrews farther testified as follows:
Q. I want to ask you a few questions about your family's operations on the property.
What did your family do with the property on the east side of the fence?
A. This here (indicating)? Initially—
Q. Yeah, on the east side.
A. Initially, we was dry land wheat.
Q. What year did you start dry land farming?
A. I don't recall whether it was in 1955 or c56 because we had other parcels. We had
over 200 acre of wheat allotment, so this might have been the year it was out. I don't
know.
Q. So it was 1955 or 56?
A. c55, c56, yes. It would be.
Q. How long did your family do the dryland farming?
A. Well, I am going back fifty years. I am thinking about six years or seven years.
(Id. at 11.)
30.
After the Andrews family dry farmed their property for a period of time, they began
to run livestock on their property. (Id. at 13-14.) Verness Andrews testified as follows:
Q. Were you involved with the cattle operation for the duration of the time your
family owned the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And just so I understand that cattle operation, then, occurred on . . . occurred to
the east of the fenceline. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
(Id. at 14.)
31.
Verness Andrews testified regarding the Original Fence as follows:
Q. Was the fence there when you family bought the property?
A. Yes, it was there. It'd been there for quite a few years.
Q. Do you lcnow what the owners to the west of the fence did with their property?
A. Well, they, they farmed most of it.
7

Q What kind of farming would they do 9
A Well, they had hay and some giain
Q How often did you come in contact with the owneis on the west side of the fence9
A Oh, piobably daily I mean, we weie neighbois We, we weie out woikmg the
fields, you know, at the same time
(Id at 15)
32
Regaidmg the boundanes between the piopeities, Vemess Andiews testified as
follows
Q Did you evei have any discussions with the Fowkes family there on the west of
the fence about wheie the boundaiy was between the pioperties9
A Not that I know of, no
Q Were there evei any disputes about where the boundaiy was 9
A No
Q What was youi undei standing of whei e the boundaiy was between the pi operties9
A Wheie, wheie the fence went Wheie it originally was
{Id at 17)
33
Verness Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family used a plow that "had a
tendency to throw the dirt up against the fence " {Id at 14-15 ) He testified that "that was fine when
we was farming against it, but when we put livestock m heie, I lemembei when then hay got giam,
why, when—a couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through the fence And
that doesn't make good neighbors, but some of the fence was oldei It was rusty wire so we had to
leplace the fencing when we went to the livestock operation We had to impiove on it " {Id at 15 )
34
Verness Andrews furthei testified as follows "Theie was no dispute about the
boundaiy The fence was the boundaiy They, they didn't say, 'You got to move your fence' or
anything else They said, cYoui cows aie on my property '" {Id at 23 )
35
The Fowkes family farmed on then side of the Ongmal Fence, the Andiews family
operated on then side, ct[a]nd the existing fence as we undeistood it was the boundai y line—pi operty
line " (Id at 22 )
36
Vemess Andrews also testified legaidmg the boundary between the pioperties as
follows
Q
I'm asking if—whethei there was a discussion, if theie was—if people talked
about the fencelme
A Not to my knowledge We just accepted that as the boundary line
Q Okay You undeistood that the fence was boundaiy Conect9
A Yes, we opeiated as such
{Id at 24-25, 33 )
37
Vemess Andiews testified that, based on the way the Ongmal Fence was constiucted
with what he called "pioneei baibed wne," he believed the Ongmal Fence "could have been theie
thnty, forty years befoie [his family] came" in 1955 (Id at 26-27 )
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2 Deposition Testimony of R Delos Andiews
38
R Delos Andiews, who is Vemess Andiews5 biothei,leftthefaniily'sianchm 1958
and letuinedm 1971 (Deposition ofR Delos Andiews, Januaiy 25,2006 ["Delos Andiews Depo "],
at 2 0 )
39
Aftei leturnmg to the ranch, Delos Andiews "joined again with [his] father and
bi others m then cattle operation ' on the EBF Property (Id at 21 ) Delos Andrews stayed with his
family's lanch opeiations until the Andrews family sold the EBF Propeity to EBF m 1998 (Id)
40
Regarding contact with the Fowkes family, Delos Andiews testified that "Well, it
wouldn't be on a daily basis, but I thinlc weekly, passing the pickup and wave, and I thinlc fiom time
to time some visiting " (Id at 22 )
41
Delos Andiews testified that the Andiews family used then side of the Original Fence
foi giazing activities (Id at 19)
42
Delos Andrews testified that the Original Fence "was theie when we came in
the
c
spring of 55, and I suppose it had been there for Fd suspect anothei 50 yeais beyond that " (Id at
46)
43
Dmmg the time that the Andiews Family owned then property, the Ongmal Fence
was always visible (Id at 18 )
44
The Andrews family peifoimed work on the Original Fence "to keep the cattle out
of [then] neighboi 's property " (Id at 16 )
45
Delos Andiews furthei testified as follows
Q Did [the Fowkes family] faim the land light up to the fence line?
A I believe they did, yes
Q And weie your grazing activities up—up to the fence line—
A Yes
(Id at 19)
46
With respect to the boundary between the properties, Delos Andrews testified as
follows
Q Did you evei had any discussion with the property ownei s to the west of the fence
line about the fence as the boundary of the pioperty oi between the—the two
piopeities7
A I nevei lecall evei having a conveisation about the fence line that's—m any
legaid
Q Did you undei stand that the fence was the boundai y between the two pi opei ties 7
A Yes
Q I'm talking—I'm refemng to the old fence
A Yes, 1 undei stand that the fence line was the pioperty line and [] established the
ownership
(Id at 22-23 )
47
Delos Andiews furthei testified that theie was "nevei a dispute about the fence" as
being the boundaiy between the piopeities (Id at 63 )
48
Delos Andiews also testified that the Fowkes family nevei acted in amannei
inconsistent with the Ongmal Fence being the boundaiy between the piopeities (Id at 23 )
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3 Deposition Testimony of Oral C. Taylor
49.
As reflected in the Deed described in Paragraph 6(b) above, Oral C. Taylor was one
of the owners of the EBF Property. Pursuant to the Deed described in Paragraph 6(d) above, the
Andrews family conveyed title to the South lA of the Northeast % of Section 4 to Oral Taylor and his
wife, Leveda A. Taylor.
50.
Oral Taylor is a brother-in-law of Verness Andrews and Delos Andrews. (Delos
Andrews Depo. at 24.)
51.
Taylor was involved with the Andrews family business operations on the EBF
Property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 1998, although he had
less frequent involvement in the business after suffering a heart attack in about 1977. (Deposition
of Oral C. Taylor, June 8, 2007 ["Taylor Depo."], at 6-9.)
52.
Regarding the work he performed for the family business, Taylor testified as follows:
Q. Tell me a little bit more about what you did personally in the family business on,
on the property in the survey.
A. Well, I, I done everything that was there, a little. We didn't have any specific thing
that we done. Mechanic work, water, hauling hay, grain, run the combine. And then
the corn—I chopped it, some of them, run the pit sometimes, then we chopped a lot
of green hay and put it in the pit. I done both on that.
Q. During the time that you were involved in the business operations, did you come
into contact with the owners on the west side of the fence?
A. The, the Fowkeses?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes yes.
Q. Who did you, who did you come in contact with? Who do you remember?
A. Well—oh, what's his first name? Grant—the twins was Grant and them—I can't
remember—Dale, Dale Fowkes was the one that bought it from his folks, which was
living on the farm when we first moved there. And we got, we got well acquainted
with all of them.
Q. So what kind of interactions would you have with the Fowkes family?
A. I thought we had a real good relationship. Never had any trouble that I know of.
Q. Did you—do you know what they did with the —the Fowkes family what they did
with the property on the west side of the fence?
A. They had—they raised a little hay and a little grain. Other than that, that's all. Of
course, they built them yards where they fed cattle, Dale did.
{Id. at 17-19.)
53.
Regarding the boundary between the properties, Taylor testified as follows:
Q. . . . What, what was your understanding, generally where the boundary was
between your family's property and the Fowkes' property?
A. This whole fenceline that was there when we bought the place. It was right
there—it was there. As far as 1 know, that was original fence.
Q. Do you know when the fence was built?
A. I have no idea. It was long before my time.
{Id at 21-22.)
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F Events Leading to the Pi esent Conti oveisy and Othei Relevant Facts
54
Sometime aftei pm chasing the Kay Pioperty m 2004, Kay lemoved portions of the
Ongmal Fence and constmcted a new fence located to the east of the Original Fence EBF demanded
that Ka> iemove the new fence and lestoie the Ongmal Fence to its pnoi location, but Kay lefused
(Kay's Answeis to EBF's First Set of Requests foi Admission, at 2 )
55
Kay also constructed a new fence located to the east of the Ongmal Fence (Id at 3 )
56
Although EBF has demanded that Kay remove the new fence and i estoi e the Original
Tm^s to its prior condition and location, Kay has lefused to do so (Id )6
57
John L Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch Cloward, Olive Stanley, and Daiyl Stanley
have not testified m this case Kay Fust SJ Mem at 6 ^ 12 (citing Affidavit of Steven L Kay), E B f
Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing)
58
Neithei Tom Fowkes, Dale Fowkes, noi then paients at any time owned fee title to
the Kay Piopeity Kay First SJ Mem at 6 % 13 (citing Dale Fowkes Depo at 32-33, Tom Fowkes
Depo at 35), EBF Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing)
59
The parties5 piedecessors never had any discussion oi discussions about the Fence,
oi whether the Fence was or was not a boundai y Kay First S J Mem at 61f 14 (citing Delos Andi ews
Depo at 18, 22, 48-49, Verness Andrews Depo at 21, 24, 25, Oral Tayloi Depo at 22, 24, Dale
Fowkes Depo at 23, 50, Tom Fowkes Depo at 39), EBF Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing)
60
Veiness Andi ews testified that they had some "waywai d cows" go tin ough the fence
"a couple of times " (Veiness Andi ews Depo at 15 )
61
Witnesses gave the following testimony concerning lepan of the Ongmal Fence
A
We did have occasion—we—we grazed that pi opei ty with oui cattle, genei ally
in the springtime, and so fiom time to time we did, with our neighbois, do a certain
amount of lepan on it to keep it m—to keep the cattle out of oui neighbor's pi operty
(Delos Andi ews Depo at 16 )
Q Who maintained the fence we aie talking about, which is on the east side of the,
ciosshatched area?
A You talking about any particulai time?
Q Any particulai time
A Well, like I say, when I was a kid, we woiked on that fence on occasion We did
after that, but the Ajidiewses woiked on it as well
(Tom Fowkes Depo at 45 )
Q Okay Now when you weie talking with Mi Howe you mentioned
something about the i epan on this fence and you said you didn't lepan it because you
stopped running livestock on n 7
A Uh-huh
Q Explain that to me, would you
A Whoevei luns livestock it's their lesponsibihty to maintain the fence We didn't
lun any livestock, Andiewses did, so it's then lesponsibihty to continue to maintain

6

The pioperty located m between the location of the Ongmal Fence and the new fence constmcted by Kay
is lefened to heiem as the "Disputed Pioperty "
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the fence If both paities aie running livestock then it's up to both parties to continue
to maintain the fence
Q That's sort of the mle of the load or—
A Yup
(Dale Fowkes Depo at 34 )
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Thiough its motion foi partial summary judgment, EBF seeks the following lehef Fust, on
its quiet title claim, EBF seeks (1) a judgment and deciee of quiet title to the disputed pioperty m
favoi of EBF and against Kay, (2) a judgment and a decree (a) declaring that Kay and any others
claiming thiough him, have no light, title, estate, mteiest m, oi hen upon, the disputed property, and
(b) permanently enjoining Kay, and all others claiming through him, fiom encioachmg upon oi
asserting any adveise claim to the disputed pioperty, and (3) an oidei lequmng Kay to lemove the
new fence constructed on the disputed pioperty Second, as to its tiespass claim, EBF seeks a
judgment m its favor and against Kay, m an amount to be determined at a latei time, foi damages
caused by Kay's tiespass upon the disputed pioperty EBF additionally seeks an oidei dismissing
Kay's cause of action foi quiet title with piejudice EBF Motion foi Partial Summary Judgment at
2-3 (filed Sept 17,2007)
Thiough his cioss motion foi partial summaiy judgment, Kay seeks a judgment decieemg
that EBF has no claim upon the disputed property under the doctime of boundary by acquiescence
Defendant Steven L Kay's Qoss-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (filed Oct 25, 2007)
Kay also seeks to stnke Paragraphs 17 and 25 of Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed and
Matenal Facts reproduced as Paiagiaphs 17 and 25 in the Factual Background above Defendant
Steven L Kay's Motion to Stnke at 2 EBF, in turn, lequests that the Comt deny Kay's motion to
strike EBF Mem Opp'n to Stnke at 2
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings [and] depositions,
togethei with
the affidavits,
show that theie is no genuine issue as to any matenal fact and that the moving
paity is entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) "The cmajoi purpose of
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessaiy tnal by allowing the parties to pieice the pleadings to
deteimme whethei theie is a genuine issue to piesent to the fact findei '" Brown v Jorgensen, 2006
UT App 168, P 20 (quoting Reagan Outdoor Advei Inc v Lundgren, 692 P 2d 776, 779 (Utah
1984)) "A tnal couit is not authonzed to weigh facts m deciding a summary judgment motion, but
is only to deteimme whether a dispute of material fact exists[ ]" Pigs Gun Club, Inc v Sanpete
County, 2002 UT 17, P24 In considenng whether a genuine issue exists, the Court views "the facts
and all leasonable mfeiences diawn theieiiom in the light most favoiable to the nonmcwing paity "
Higgins v Salt Lake County, 855 P 2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) (quoted m Oivis v Johnson, 2008 UT
2P6)
ANALYSIS
I BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE STANDARD OF PROOF

Kay states "tins case piesents an issue of fust impression in Utah" as to the standaid of pi oof
applicable to a boundary by acquiescence claim Kay First SJ Mem at 2 See also id at 11-16 Kay
states the appiopnate standaid of proof is not articulated m lecent decisions fiom eithei the Utah
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Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals /rf at 11 (citing Ault v Holden, 44 P 3d 781 (2002)
RHNCorp v Veibell, 96 P 3d 935 (Utah 2004), Mwow v Loveless, 24P 3d997,1003 (Utah App
2001), Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v Babcock, 993 P 2d 229 (Utah App 1999)) Kay aigues the
appiopnate standard is cleai and convincing evidence, see Kay Fust SJ Mem at 10-16, and EBF
advocates a piepondeiance standard (See EBF Second SJ Mem at 1-3 )
The applicable standaid of proof is relevant to the Court's mquny on summaiy judgment See
Andalex Resources v Myers, 871 P 2d 1041, 1047 (Utah Ct App 1994) ("In giantmg a motion for
summary judgment, a trial judge must considei each element of the claim undei the appropnate
standaid of pi oof), id (citing cases fiom U S Supieme Court and Utah courts) Foi example, in
Republic Group v Won-Door Corp , plaintiff alleged fiaud The Utah Court of Appeals stated that
fiaud must be pioved by cleai and convincing evidence, and that standaid should be consideied on
a motion foi summary judgment couits m that cncumstance should considei whethei the plaintiff
has "provided evidence which, if accepted by the tnei of fact as tiue, would meet the cleai and
convincing standaid required to establish a fiaud claim " 883 P 2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct App 1994)
Similaily, in Anderson v Libby Lobby, the United States Supreme Court held that wheie a
defamation claim lequired clear and convincing proof, "the trial judge's summaiy judgment inquiry
as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence piesented is such that a juiy
applying that evidentiary standard could leasonably find foi either the plaintiff oi the defendant "477
U S 242,255 (1986) (emphasis added) See also West v Lincoln Benefit Life Co ,509F 3dl60,171
(3d Cir 2007) ("When the party moving foi summaiy judgment beais the bin den of piovmg certain
facts by cleai and convincing evidence, we must evaluate the facts m support of the motion in light
of that evidentiary burden ") (quoting Anderson, 477 U S at 252) 7 Given the importance of the
applicable standard of pi oof to the Court's summaiy judgment niquiiy, the Court considei s, fust,
whethei Utah law currently provides the appropnate standard as to boundary by acquiescence claims
"Boundaiy by acquiescence is a long established doctime m Utah " Mason v Loveless, 2001
UT App 145, P17 (Utah Ct App 2001) Indeed, "[i]t was first mentioned m Smtzgable v
Worseldine, 5 Utah 315 (1887) but was held inapplicable in that case The first Utah application of
the principle was in Holmes v Judge, 31 Utah 269 (1906) " Hales v Frakes, 600 P 2d 556, 558
(Utah 1979) Thioagh many leported opinions that now span moie than a centuiy, the doctime has
undeigone significant development An equitable doctime, see Massey v Gi iffiths, 2005 UT App
410, PI 1, boundary by acquiescence includes the following foui elements ct(i) occupation up to a
visible line maiked by monuments, fences, oi buildings, (n) mutual acquiescence m the line as a
boundai y, (in) foi a long penod of time, (iv) by adjoining landownei s " RHN Coip v Veibell, 2004
UT 60, P23 (quoting Jacobs v Hafen, 917 P 2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)) These elements are, of
couise, the lesult of caieful dehbeiation ovei time that has, foi example, even added and then
Ievoked an additional element See Halladay v Cluff 685 P 2d 500, 505 (Utah 1984) (establishing

1

See also Anchoi age Realty Tiustv Donovan, 2004 ME 137, PI 5 (Me 2004) In Maine, wheie boundary
by acquiescence must be pi oven by ' cleai and convincing evidence," a plaintiff seeking to establish a boundaiy by
acquiescence on summary judgment must show she "would be entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law and that a
fact-finder would be compelled to find it highly piobable that those elements have been established " Id (citation
omitted)
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an "objective uncertainty55 requirement to the boundary by acquiescence claim) and Staker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) (overruling Halladay's "objective uncertainty55 element).
Utah courts have also articulated the policies served by the doctrine. The landmark case
Staker v. Ainsworth revisited the policies served by the doctrine. 785 P.2d at 423. The Court noted
the doctrine "fills an important gap in the law left unaddressed by other doctrines[ J " including the
two other major doctrines used to settle disputes between adjoining landowners—estoppel and
boundary by agreement. Id. & n.4 (citing BACKMAN, T H E LAW OF PRACTICAL LOCATION OF
BOUNDARIES AND THE N E E D FOR AN ADVERSE POSSESSION R E M E D Y , 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957,
962-68). To illustrate the important role served by boundary by acquiescence, the Court stated the
following:
For instance, settling a dispute under boundary by agreement requires that there was
an express agreement between the parties. If actual knowledge of the boundary exists,
there is no consideration exchanged and the agreement fails. Since sufficient proof
of an agreement is often difficult to come by, the doctrine of boundary by agreement
is not often invoked. There are similar problems in applying the estoppel theory to
settle boundary disputes. Thus, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, based
largely on policy considerations (of avoiding litigation and promoting stability in
landownership) fills a small but important gap.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from realization,
ancient in our law, that peace and good order of society is [sic] best
served by leaving at rest possible disputes over long established
boundaries. Its essence is that where there has been any type of a
recognizable physical boundary, which has been accepted as such for
a long period of time, it should be presumed that any dispute or
disagreement over the boundary has been reconciled in some manner.
Staker, 785 P.2d at 423 (quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (alteration in
original)). See also Mason, 2001 UT App at PI7 (stating the doctrine's purpose is "stability in
boundaries, repose of titles, and the prevention of litigation.") (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
A. Standard of Proof Applied in Previous Utah Cases
Among the many reported appellate decisions considering the doctrine, several review claims
that a trial court's conclusion as to the issue was or was not supported by sufficient evidence. See,
e.g., Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457 (Utah 1935); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d 133 (1970);
Universal Inv. Corp. v Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35 (1971); Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974);
JuddFamily Ltd Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990); Gillmor v Cummings, 904
P.2d 703 (Utah 1995); RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60; Argyle v Jones, 2005 UT App 346;
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168. in short, it is indisputable that Utah trial and appellate
courts, for several decades now, have been reviewing evidence and determining whether it is
sufficient to establish boundaries by acquiescence. The question Kay raises, then, is not whether
Utah courts have been applying a particular standard of proof in such cases, but which standard of
proof they have been applying. Kay accurately notes that among the many reported decisions
considering the doctrine, there is a dearth of express discussion on the standard of proof applied. Kay
F i r s t s J Mem. at 11-12.
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Kay aigues a leview of cases on the doctime demonstiates Utah couits have m fact, sub
silentio, been applying a "clear and convincing" standaid all along Id at 12 hi support of this
mfeience, Kay points to a vanety of cases fiom 1935 (Nelson v Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457) to the neaipiesent {Brown v Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168) As noted above, none of the cases cited by Kay
articulate a standaid of pi oof While aigumg that "Utah, m fact, adheies to a cleai, convincing
evidence standaid when granting relief under the [d]octnne[,]" Kay notes that "[i]n almost all of
these cases, the evidence of acquiescence was m the foim of affirmative acts of the parties oi then
piedecessois " Kay Fust SJ Mem at 13 As this latter statement suggests, Kay's aiguments offei
bettei support to an element of the acquiescence doctime (mutual acquiescence in a visible line as
a boundaiy) than to an aigument that Utah couits have been applying a cccleai and convincing"
standaid of pi oof
Indeed, the Court's leview of Utah cases on the doctime leads it to the opposite conclusion
foi at least thiee leasons Fust, absent a contiaiy indication, thepiesumed standard of pi oof is civil
cases is apiepondeiance of the evidence See Hansen v Hansen, 958 P 2d 931, 934-35 (Utah 1998)
("the standard of proof generally applied m civil proceedings is the pieponderance of the evidence
standard") (citing Johns v Shulsen, 111 P 2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), Lipman v Industrial
Com??7X592P2d616,618(Utahl979),Mormv Farmers Home Mut Ins Co ,500 P 2d 505,507
(\912\Harkenv
BoardofOil, Gas & Mining, 920 P 2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996)) When a court
applies a parti culai standaid m pi oof to a civil case and does not state standaid being applied, it is
most rational to piesume the standaid being applied is a piepondeiance of the evidence
Second, the "clear and convincing" standaid is itself a high buiden to meet Given the
difficulty of meeting that buiden and the considerable numbei of Utah cases that have consideied
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in boundary by acquiescence cases, one would expect
to see frequent and explicit refeience to such a high standaid m the leported decisions However, no
express lefeience is made See Lovett v Continental Bank & Trust Co , 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79 (Utah
1955) (describing the preponderance standard as a finding "that the existence of the disputed facts
are moi e pi obable than their nonexistence," describing the clear and convincing standard as a finding
"that the existence of the disputed facts are veiy highly probable," and noting that the latter standaid
"appioaches that degiee of pioof lequned in a cnminal case"), Egbert v Nissan N Am , Inc , 2007
UT 64, PP 12-13 (descnbmg the cleai and convincing standaid as "[t]he mteimediate standaid of
pi oof5 between piepondeiance and the cnminal standaid of beyond a leasonable doubt)
Thud, this Couit locates only one lepoited boundaiy by acquiescence case expiessly
lefeiencmg a standard of pi oof—Gillmor v Cummmgs, 904 P 2d 703 (Utah 1995) Theie, the tnal
couit found that Cummmgs, the pioponent of boundaiy by acquiescence, had failed to show such
a boundaiy had been established The Couit of Appeals of Utah leviewed the evidence and affiimed
the trial court's holding thus ct[W]e find sufficient evidence to support the tnal couit's finding that
Cummmgs failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that he had established a new boundaiy
by acquiescence " 904 P 2d at 707 (emphasis added) The Couit of Appeals m Gillmor cleai]y did
not considei the question of the appropnate standaid of pi oof on its ments, and thus its statement
lefeiencmg such a standaid is dicta with aiguably limited piecedential value The Couit also notes
that Gillmor upheld the tnal couit's finding that a boundaiy by acquiescence had not been
established by paity advocating application of the doctrine Howevei, given those possible
limitations, the above-quoted language fiom Gillmor clearly implies the appiopnate standaid of
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pioof is aprepondeiance of the evidence This express lefeience to a standard of pioof likely leflects
the standaid courts have been applying to such cases all along
B Appropriate Standard of Proof
In addition to his aiguments that Utah couits have been applying a cleai and convincing
standaid all along, Kay offeis additional reasons foi applying the standaid He atgues a cleai and
convincing standaid is appiopnate because (1) the standaid is applied in the leal piopeity doctnnes
of public dedication, piescnptive easements, deed lefoimation foi mistake, and adveise possession
founded on paiol gifts, Kay First SJ Mem at 15 Kay Second SJ Mem at 10-12, and (2) othei
jmisdictions have adopted the standaid foi boundaiy by acquiescence claims, Kay Fust SJ Mem at
16, Kay Second SJ Mem at 10-11
1 Use of the clear and convincing standard in other contexts
Kay argues the clear and convincing standard should be applied m cases of boundaiy by
acquiescence because it is applied m cases of public dedication of a I oad, see Campbell v Box Elder
County, 962 P 2d 806, 808 (Utah App 1998), State ex rel Div of Forestry Fire & State Lands v
Six Mile Ranch Co , 132 P 3d 687 (Utah App 2006), piescnptive easements, see Mar chant v Park
City, 771 P 2d 677 (Utah App 1989),iefoimationof a deed foi mistake, see Gray v Gray, 1 6 0 P 2 d
432 (Utah 1945), and adverse possession founded on a paiol gift, see Raleigh v Wells, 81 P 908
(Utah 1905) Kay Fust SJ Mem at 14-15 (citing, inter aha, the above cases) Kay aigues "[t]he
common theme to all these cases is that when a court divests a party of a leal property mteiest, a
showing of cleai and convincing evidence is required " Id at 15
But Kay's statement oveilooks what may be a significant distinctions between the above
doctnnes and boundary by acquiescence Fust, boundary by acquiescence may also be distinguished
fiom public dedication of a road "[Bjecause the law does not lightly allow the tiansfei of piopeity
fiom private to public use, the [government] bears the burden of piovmg dedication to tire public by
cleai and convincing evidence " Six Mile Ranch Co , 2006 UT App P36 (citations and internal
quotation maiks omitted) Draper City v Estate ofBernaido, 888 P 2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995))
In contiast, "boundary by acquiescence cannot be established when one of the adjoining tracts of
land is part of the public domain " Cat tei v Ham ath, 925 P 2d 960, 962 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted) Because boundaiy by acquiescence does not contemplate transfers of land from public to
pnvate use, the heightened standard of proof cannot be applied to the acquiescence doctime on that
basis
Second, lefoimation of a deed is appiopnate only aftei a showing of clear and convincing
evidence, Bown v Loveland, 678 P 2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984) It is appiopnate "'wheie the teims of
the wi ltten msti ument ai e mistaken m that they do not show the ti ue intent of the agi eement between
the paities Theie aie two giounds foi lefoimation of such an agi eement mutual mistake of the
paities and ignoiance oi mistake by one paity, coupled with fiaud by the othei paity "' RHN Corp
v Veibell, 96 P 3d 935, P36 (Utah 2004) (quoting Hottinger v Jensen, 684 P 2d 1271, 1273 (Utah
1984)) The elements lequned to lefoim a deed obviously diffei fiom boundaiy by acquiescence and
it is not immediately apparent to the Court why use of the same standard of proof m both contexts
would be appiopnate
Thud, while the doctrines of piescnptive easement and adverse possession adjudicate claims
adverse to the opposing landownei 5s mteiest, boundaiy by acquiescence concerns claims based on
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mutual acceptance of a boundaiy by piedecessois in mteiest See Stakei, 785 P 2d at 423 (quoting
Baum v Defa, 525 P2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (descnbing boundaiy by acquiescence as a
piesumption that a boundaiy dispute has been pieviously leconciled wheie a lecogmzable physical
boundaiy "has been accepted as such foi a long penod of time") At least one court has found this
distinction sufficient to justifying different standaids of pi oof Walteis v Snyder 570 N W 2d 301,
303 (Mich App 1997) (aA claim of acquiescence does not lequne that the possession be hostile oi
without permission Thus, application of the highei standaid of proof seems mappiopriate to an
acquiescence claim55)
Finally, the Court notes the Utah Supieme Couit's lecent indication that it is disinclined to
unduly lestiict what is alleady a lestuctive doctrine In RHN Corp v Veibell, the paity opposing
boundary by acquiescence aigued that one of the deeds tiansfenmg the pioperty at issue placed a
party "on constiuctive notice of the lecoid boundaiy 55 2004 UT 60, P 28 The Couit rejected the
"constiuctive notice55 aigument on the following grounds "To allow constiuctive notice of the tiue
boundaiy m the conveying deed to negate acquiescence would unduly lestiict the doctime of
boundaiy by acquiescence by preempting claims whenevei parties mutually acquiesce m a visible
line that conflicts with a lecoid boundary contained in the conveying document " Id The Court then
stated that the "constiuctive notice55 argument biought to mind the "objective uncertainty"
lequnement the Court eliminated fiom the acquiescence analysis m Stoker v Ainswoi th Accoidmg
to the Court, "We eliminated this fifth lequn em ent because it cmakes boundaiy by acquiescence less
piactical, further lestucts what was alieady a lestuctive doctime, and effectively elimmate[s]
boundary by acquiescence as a viable doctime foi settling propeity disputes in Utah "' Id P 29
(quoting Stakei, 785 P 2d at 423) (additional internal quotation maiks and citation omitted) Given
the already-iestnctive requnements of the doctime (including twenty yeais of occupation up to an
mutual acquiescence m a visible line as a boundary), imposing a cleai and convmcmg standaid of
proof on the doctrine may unduly narrow its applicability
2 Use of the cleai and convincing and preponderance standards in other jurisdictions
Kay accuiately notes that several othei states apply a clear and convincing standaid to the
boundary by acquiescence question Kay Fust SJ Mem at 16 The tieatise POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY notes that "sevei al states i equne that the claimant pi ove 1 ecogmtion and acquiescence by
cleai and convincing evidence oi some closely allied standaid," and cites case law fiom Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Veimont, and Washington 8
The Powell treatise notes that £C[a]mong the leasons given foi the cleai and convincing
standaid aie (1) to discouiage aggressive, assertive action inconsistent with goodneighboihness, (2)
to avoid a flood of litigation, and (3) to naiiowly tailor a doctrine that transfeis title to piopeity

9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05[8] (Michael Allan Wolfed , LexisNexis Matthew Bendei 2007)
(citing Tewesv Pine Lane Faims, 522 N W 2d 801 (Iowa 1994), Daitv Thompson, 154 N W 2d 82 (Iowa 1967),
Qosbyv Baizley, 642 A 2d 150 (Me 1994), Davis v Mitchell, 628 A 2d 657 (Me 1993), Maija Coip v Allain,
622 A 2d 1182 (Me 1993), Tayloi v Hanson, 541 A 2d 155 (Me 1988), Calthoipe v Abi ahamson, 44] A 2d 284
(Me 1982), Wojahn v Johnson, 297 N W 2d 298 (Minn 1980), Manz v Bohai a, 367 N W 2d 743 (N D 1985),
Lien v Beaid, 478 N W 2d 578 (S D 1991), Heath v Dudley, 530 A 2d 151, 153 (Vt 1987), Lilly v Lynch, 945
P 2d 727 (Wash App 1997)) But see id (stating "othei courts lequue only a fan pi eponderance of the evidence")
(citing Walteisv Snyder, 570 N W2d 301 (Mich App 1997))
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without compliance with the statute of frauds " 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05 [8] (citing
Manz) But none of those aiguments persuade the Court that the clear and convincing standaid
should be applied in Utah First, the cleai and convincing standard seems equally or moie likely than
the preponderance standard to promote aggressive behavior inconsistent with good neighboilmess
True, it seems that one is less likely, ex ante, to attempt to establish an mconect boundaiy when he
laiows he would be lequned, twenty yeais latei, to piove acquiescence by cleai and convincing
evidence as opposed to a prepondei ance of evidence On the othei hand, howevei, a lecent giantee
of property is less likely to distuib a longstanding boundary if he knows pnoi acquiescence may be
pi oven by meie prepondei ance of the evidence Foi similar leasons, it is not cleai that a
piepondeiance standaid would engendei more litigation than a cleai and convincing standard
Finally, a doctrine that permits transfer of ownership m contradiction of lecoid boundaries and
without compliance with the statute of frauds should be appropriately nan owed But as noted above,
the doctrine itself is "aheady a restnctive doctrine," Veibell, 2004 UT P 29, and the Utah Supreme
Court has expiessed leluctance to "unduly lestnct" it Id P 28
The Powell ti eatise also notes that othei courts have I equn ed only a pi epondei ance standai d
9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05[8] (citing Walters v Snydei, 570 N W 2d 301 (Mich App
1997)) In Walters v Snyder, the Couit of Appeals of Michigan explicitly held that while a "cleai
and cogent evidence" standaid applies to adveise possession claims biought m Michigan, a
pieponderance of the evidence standaid governs boundaiy by acquiescence claims 570N W 2d 301,
303 (Mich App 1997) The Michigan court concluded the heightened standard was inappropriate
because, unlike adverse possession claims, claims of boundary by acquiescence do not require the
element of hostility
hi contrast to a claim of adveise possession that requnes a showing by cleai
and cogent evidence that the possession was "actual, visible, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous, and unmtenupted foi tire statutoiy penod of 15 yeais, hostile
and under covei of a claim of ughtf J" a claim of acquiescence to a boundaiy line
based upon the statutory period of fifteen years lequnes meiely a showing that the
parties acquiesced m the line and tieated the line as the boundaiy foi the statutoiy
period, mespeutive of whether there was a bona fide controveisy legaidmg the
boundary A claim of acquiescence does not require that the possession be hostile or
without permission Thus, application of the highei standaid of pi oof seems
inappropriate to an acquiescence claim
As furthei support for om conclusion, this Court in Sackett recently affirmed a tiial
couit decision finding acquiescence foi the statutoiy penod by a piepondeiance of
the evidence Although the piopnety of the standaid used was not challenged on
appeal, nonetheless, in leviewmgthetnal court's findings and conclusions, this Court
did not disappiove of the standaid used and affnmed the decision of the lowei court
See also 12 AM JUR 2D, BOUNDARIES, § 99, p 634, indicating that one lelymg upon
a claim of acquiescence must show it by such a pi epondei ance of the evidence as will
entitle him to the boundaiy claimed
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Id (internal quotation maiks and citations omitted)9
Foi the leasons stated above, the Court concludes, fust, that Utah courts histoncally have
likely applied a pieponderance standaid to boundary by acquiescence claims, and second, that the
preponderance standard adequately protects the mteiests at stake m claims raising what is already
a lestrictive doctrine In any case, the issue of the standard of proof would not affect the outcome of
this case Looking to its facts, the Court concludes the evidence supporting application of boundary
by acquiescence meets the cleai and convincing standard, and therefoie the lesult is the same
legaidless of the standard used
II ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE APPLIED TO THIS CASE

An equitable doctime, see Massey v Griffiths, 2005 UT App 410, P l l , boundaiy by
acquiescence includes the following fom elements "(i) occupation up to a visible line maiked by
monuments, fences, 01 buildings, (n) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundaiy, (in) foi a long
penod of time, (IV) by adjoining landowners " RHN Corp v Veibell, 2004 UT 60, P 23 (quoting
Jacobsv Hafen, 917P2d 1078,1080 (Utah 1996)) "The requnement that mutual acquiescence be
foi a long penod of time has been mteipieted m Utah to mean at least twenty yeais " Veibell, 2004
UT P 30 (citing Jacobs v Hafen, 917 P 2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996), Hobson v Panguitch Lake
Corp , 530 P 2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975))
In considenng arguendo whethei the parties5 evidence is sufficiently compelling to grant
summary judgment undei the cleai and convincing standaid (although the Couit concludes only a
piepondeiance is necessary), the Court follows a stiaightforwaid formulation fiom the Supieme
Court of Maine, which standard seems consistent with the "cleai and convincing5' standaid applied
m other areas of Utah law In Maine, wheie boundaiy by acquiescence must be pi oven by "cleai and
convincing evidence," a plaintiff seeking to establish a boundaiy by acquiescence on summary
judgment must show she "would be entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law and that a fact-finder
would be compelled to find it highly piobable that those elements have been established " Id
(citation omitted) Anchorage Realty Trust v Donovan, 2004 ME 137, PI5 (Me 2004) Cf Lovett
v Continental Bank & Trust Co, 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79 (Utah 1955) (desciibmg the clear and
convincing standaid as sufficient to convince the tnei of that "that the existence of the disputed facts
aie veiy highly piobable")
The parties do not dispute that the Oiigmal Fence has been in existence sufficiently long to
satisfy element (m) (Kay Second SJ Mem at 12 (stating Kay "acknowledges that the [fjence m
question has been m existence foi a long penod of time (the thud element of [bjoundaiy by
[acquiescence)"), EBF Fn st SJ Mem at 3 (noting that Delos Andi ews, Veiness Andi ews, and Oral
Tayloi testified the Ongmal Fence had been m existence since at least 1955 (citing facts set forth
lepioduced in above Factual Backgiound as Paiagiaphs 31,42, and 53), and that Tom Fowkes and
Dale Fowkes, bom m 1947 and 1949, respectively, testified that the Original Fence was m existence

9

Kay also relies on the AM JUR boundaries tieatise m arguing foi the opposite lesult leached by the
Michigan Court Kay Fust SJ Mem at 12 The language in that souice seems confusingly to combine the two
standards of proof, but certainly does not repudiate the piepondeiance standaid u [0]ne lelymg upon acquiescence
must show it by such a prepondei ance of the evidence, often designated as cleai and convincing evidence, as will
entitle him oi hei to the boundary claimed " 12 AM JUR 2D BOUNDARIES § 104 (2007) (citations omitted)

19

when they were born (citing facts set forth reproduced in above Factual Background as Paragraphs
18 and 24); Kay First SJ Mem. at 3, 5 (not disputing any of Paragraphs 18, 24, 31, 42, or 53).)
The Court now addresses the remaining three elements. Because of its relevance to the other
two elements, the Court first considers element (iv) and particularly whether, as Kay claims, the
testimony of Tom and Dale Fowkes "is of no probative value on the issue of acquiescence by [Kay's]
predecessors-in-title" because Tom and Dale Fowkes never held the Kay Property in fee title Kay
Second SJ Mem at 14.
A Adjoining Landowners
The parties do not dispute that the properties at issue are adjoining and contiguous parcels
of land and that EBF and Kay are the record owners of the respective properties. (EBF First S J Mem
at iv ^ 3-4; id at 2; Kay First S J Mem at 3; Answer and Counterclaim at 5 If 29 (stating EBF "owns
property immediately adjacent to Kay's property"); Reply to Counterclaim at 2 ^ 29 ("EBF admits
that it owns property immediately adj acent to property purportedly owned by Kay.55)). However, Kay
argues that Tom and Dale Fowkes5 testimony is irrelevant to the issue of acquiescence by "adjoining
landowners55 because, although they worked on the pi operty for many years, they were nevei holders
of fee-title in the Kay Property. Therefore, Kay argues, their testimonies, reproduced in Paragraphs
17 and 25 above, should be stricken.10 See Kay Strike Mem. at 2-3; Kay First SJ Mem. at 20-21;
Kay Second SJ Mem. at 13-16; Kay Reply Strike Mem. at 2-5.

Kay also argues Tom and Dale Fowkes' testimony in Paragraphs 17 and 25 should be stricken because in
their depositions they indicated the Ongmal Fence was wheie they "undei stood" the boundary between the
properties to be (or was then "understanding" legardmg that boundary), and, according to Kay, then
"understanding" concerning the boundaiy "may be heaisayf ]" Kay Sti ike Mem at 2-5 The disputed testimony is, hi
l elevant part, as follows
Q All right
Looking again at the sin vey, just based on youi expei lence with the pi operty and
woikmg on the faim, where did you understand the boundary to be between the pioperties we've
been talking about7
Answei On the fenceline
(Tom Fowkes Depo at 18 )
Q Okay Based on youi expenence with the—the property that we've been talking aboul and
you've testified today what was your understanding where the boundaiy was between youi family's
pi operty and the Andi ews pi operty?
A The—fence—where the fence was
(Dale Fowkes Depo at 23 )
Kay's heaisay objection based on the single woid "undeistanding" points to no out-of-court statement and
thus can only speculate as to a possible basis in heaisay Moie significantly, Kay's objection to this testimony
ovei looks the veiy questions asked, which expiessly sought the deposed's undei standings of the boundaiy based on
their experience with it Tom Fowkes Depo at 18 (asking legaiding the boundaiy "fj]ust based on youi experience
with the pi operty and woikmg on the faim, wheie did you undei stand
"), Dale Fowkes Depo at 23 (ct[b]ased on
youi expenence with the
pi operty that we've been talking about
what was youi understanding
") See
State v Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, PI 6 ("Lay fact testimony has always been a primary, acceptable souice of
evidence m our system Accoidingly, lay fact testimony . is admissible so long as it complies with othei portions
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, including
rule 602's requiiement that a witness have peisonal knowledge of the
matter about which he or she is testifying ") (citations omitted) As such, Kay's motion to strike the Fowkes'
testimony based on heaisay is denied
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in RHN Corp. v. Veibell. There, the
party opposing recognition of a boundary by acquiescence noted the absence of direct testimony that
the relevant holders of fee title, both of whom were deceased, believed that the fence at issue was
the boundary. 2004 UT P26. In response, the Court explained that ubecause acquiescence may be
inferred from the landowner's actions, the absence of direct evidence of a PJ^£wner's subjective
belief concerning the boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual acquiescence.55 Id (citing Stoker,
785 P.2d at 420-21) (emphasis added). The Court noted "[tjhis especially holds true where that
owner is deceased and unable to testify." Id. The Court then applied the above rules to the facts of
Veibell, noting the evidence, based at least in part on the testimony of a /?0«-Iando wner (the fee-title
holder's brother) from which acquiescence could reasonably inferred: - "
~~
The Ericksens' recognition of the fence as a boundary can be reasonably
inferred from the evidence presented at trial. Durell Ericksen's brother, Bryce, who
worked on the farm during the 1960s, testified that he always believed that the fence
was the true boundary. The Ericksens' actions over the years also indicate that they
have recognized the fence as a boundary. They have farmed up to the fence line since
1938, and they never occupied the land south of the fence. Furthermore, the
Ericksens never objected to the fence line as the boundary. In light of these facts, the
trial court's inference of the Ericksens5 acquiescence is not clearly erroneous.
Id. P 27. Significantly, the above explanation affirms an inference of acquiescence based on activity
of the relevant family and not based solely on evidence relating to the fee-title holders themselves.
Indeed, the subjective belief of Bryce Eriksen—the brother of Durell Eriksen, the fee-title
holder—was expressly considered in the analysis and was therefore probative to the issue of
acquiescence. Under Veibell, then, the fact that Tom and Dale Fowkes were not owners of the Kay
Property does not render their testimony irrelevant as to the issue of acquiescence.
Here, all of the prior owners of the Kay Property are deceased except for Olive Stanley who,
Tom Fowkes testified, did not participate in farming activities on the property. (Tom Fowkes Depo.
at 14-15, 34, 46.)11 Thus, Tom and Dale Fowkes5 testimony is likely the only basis from which
acquiescence by the prior landowners can be inferred. Additionally, their testimony provides a
reasonable basis for such an inference: both testified that as boys they assisted their father and their
grandfather—their grandfather being a fee-title holder—with the farm operations. (Dale Fowkes
Depo. at 16; Tom Fowkes Depo. at 12; Factual Background \ 5.) Later, both worked extensively on
the farm as adults. (See Tom Fowkes Depo. at 25) (testifying he farmed his family's property until
"[u]p into the c70s, I would assume, maybe even later than that'5); Dale Fowkes Depo. at 33-34
(using the land until 2001).) Their experiences relative to the farming activities on the Kay Property
from childhood (which included exposure to the farming activities of their father and grandfather
on the property) through adulthood certainly form a basis from which, if appropriate, acquiescence
can be reasonably inferred. Kay5s motion to strike their testimony on grounds of irrelevance is thus
denied.

11

Tom Fowkes further testified that Olive came down to the Kay Property when her grandparents, John
and Maud Fowkes (who died in 1957 and 1965, respectively) were alive, but that, "[a]fter that, the visits would have
been sparse." Id at 46-47; EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv ffi| 1-2.
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B. Occupation up to a Visible Line
In Stoker v. Ainsworth, the Utah Supreme Court listed the following activities as indicative
of occupation up to a visible line: "[hjouses were built and occupied; land was farmed, improved,
and irrigated; and livestock was kept. Lynn Ainsworth 5s affidavit, for instance, is typical in that it
indicates that the Ainsworth family has farmed the property within the fence lines since at least
1930." 785 P.2d 417,420. These are the same types of activities the Andrews and Fowkes families
conducted on their respective properties for over forty years. For instance, Delos Andrews testified
that the fence was always visible during the time the Andrews family owned the EBF Property.
(Delos Andrews Depo. at 18.) For most of the years the Andrews family owned the EBF Property,
they used their side of the Original Fence for grazing. (Verness Andrews Depo. at 11-15; Delos
Andrews Depo. at 18-19.) On the other hand, the Fowkes family used their side of the Original
Fence for dry fanning. (Tom Fowkes Depo. at 11-12; Dale Fowkes Depo. at 33.) Delos Andrews'
testimony on the element of occupation up to a visible line is particularly relevant:
Q: Did [the Fowkes family] farm the land right up to the fence line?
A: I believe they did, yes.
Q: And were your grazing activities up—up to the fence line—
A: Yes.
(Delos Andrews Depo. at 19.)
Verness Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family used a plow that "had a tendency to
throw the dirt up against the fence." (Id. at 14-15.) He testified that "that was fine when we was
farming against it, but when we put livestock in here, I remember when their hay got grain, why,
when—a couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through the fence. And that
doesn't make good neighbors, but some of the fence was older. It was rusty wire so we had to replace
the fencing when we went to the livestock operation. We had to improve on it." (Id. at 15.) These
facts also plainly indicate occupation up to a visible line.
Additionally, there is no evidence that the respective land owners and their families ever
attempted to use the property on the other side of the Original Fence for any purpose. Accordingly,
the first element of boundary by acquiescence has been met.
C. Mutual Acquiescence
The Supreme Court in Veibell provided the following guidance on the issue of mutual
acquiescence:
"Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to
establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish that the
parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties." Ault v. Holden,
2002 UT 33, PI 8. To acquiesce means to "recognize and treat an observable line,
such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the adjacent
landowner's property." Id. Acquiescence is a "highly fact-dependent question," see
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256, and "acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred
from evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may
evidence the landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the
demarcation between the properties." Ault, 2002 UT 33 at PI 8.

22

Courts have looked at vaiious landownei actions as evidence of acquiescence
m a visible line as a boundaiy Occupation up to, but nevei ovei, the line is evidence
of acquiescence See Stoker v Ainsworth, 785 P 2d 417, 420-21 (Utah 1990)
(weighing the fact that "owneis occupied houses, constructed buildings, farmed,
ungated, and laised livestock only within then lespective fenced aieas" (emphasis
added)), RICHARD R POWELL & MICHAEL ALLEN ROHAN, 9 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 68 05 [6][d] (2004) (noting that "'cultivating up to, but never ovei, a
line'" is evidence of acquiescence (quoting Knutson v Jensen, 440 N W 2d 260,263
(N D 1989)) Howevei, occupation by itself may m some cases be insufficient to
establish acquiescence See Hales v Frakes, 600 P 2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979)
("Plaintiffs occupation to the fence without mteifeience was not sufficient to
establish defendant's acquiescence m the fence as a boundaiy ") Acquiescence may
also be shown by silence, oi the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary
See Judd Family Ltd P'ship v Hutchings, 797 P 2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990)
(weighing the fact that "not once did Judd then suggest oi imply that the fence was
not m the pi oper location"), Stoker, 785 P 2d at 420-21 (weighing the fact that "thei e
[was] no indication m the lecord that any predecessor m interest behaved m a fashion
inconsistent with the belief that the fence line was the boundary" and that "there
[was] no indication that any landownei evei notified his neighboi of a disagreement
ovei the hue boundary" m finding mutual acquiescence), Mason v Loveless, 2001
UT App 145, P20, 24 P 3d 997 ("Om settled case law
cleaily piovides that
acquiescence may be established by silence ")
2004 UT PP 24-25 See also Brown v Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, PP 14-18, Argyle v Jones,
2005 UTApp 346, PP 10-15
Hei e, the Andiews landowners (Verness Andrews, Delos Andrews, and Oral Tayloi) plainly
testified—and Kay does not dispute—that they believed the Original Fence maiked the boundaiy
between the Kay Pioperty and the EBF Property (Factual Background, Yl 32, 46, 53 (quoting,
respectively, Veiness Andrews Depo at 17, Delos Andrews Depo at 22-23, Oial Taylor Depo at
2 ] -22)) Tom and Dale Fowkes gave the same testimony (Factual Background, ^ 17,25 (quoting,
) espectively, Tom Fowkes Depo at 1 8, Dale Fowkes Depo at 22-24) )
The activities of the Andi ews and Fowkes families also plainly confoimed to then subjective
beliefs about the boundaiy as maiked by the Ongmal Fence Foi example, Delos Andiews testified
that the Andiews grazed then cattle up to the fence line and that the Fowkes diy fanned up to the
fence line (Delos Andrews Depo at 19 ) The fact that the parties farmed and giazed up to the fence
line stionglv suggests boxh Jkmbes "iecognize[d] and tieat[ed]" the Ongmal Fence "as the
boundary[ ]" Ault v Holden, 2002 UT 33, PI 8 This mutual recognition and acceptance of the
Original Fence as the boundary is also evidenced by the fact that both the Andiews and the Fowkes
families peifoimed lepan work on the fence (Factual Background 1fl[ 44, 61 (citing Delos Andrews
Depo at 16,1 om Fowkes Depo at 45, Dale Fowkes Depo at 34) )
Kay aigues that "the evidence shows that dunng the owneiship of the Andiews, the time
penod m which [pjlamtiff asseits the acquiescence occuned, the pnmaiy function of the Fence was
to keep then livestock out of the Fowkes5 ciops " (Kay Fust SJ Mem at 19 ) Kay also notes that m
this case there is no evidence as to why the Fence was onginally built {Id) Citing Hancock v
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Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990) and other cases, Kay argues that where the
alleged primary function of the Original Fence was to control livestock, the Fence cannot be
evidence of acquiescence. (Kay First SJ Mem. at 18-19.) See also Jorgensen, 2006 UT App P 17
(discussing "the importance of the purpose of a fence" in the boundary by acquiescence analysis)
(citation omitted). Kay's argument concerning the purpose or function of the fence does not persuade
the Court that acquiescence did not occur. While the purpose or function of a fence is relevant to the
acquiescence analysis, see id., such a purpose or function does not preclude the conclusion that,
whatever a fence's function, the relevant landowners acquiesced to the fence as a boundary. The
purpose of a fence is but one consideration in the overall question of mutual acquiescence. Indeed,
here, the Andrews' testimony confirms their regard for the fence as a boundary, even as the fence
functioned to control cattle. (See Delos Andrews Depo. at 16 (testifying the Andrews family "from
time to time . . . did, with our neighbors, do a certain amount of repair on [the Fence] to keep it
in—to keep the cattle out of our neighbors 'property.") (emphasis added); Verness Andrews Depo.
at 23 ("There was no dispute about the boundary. The fence was the boundary. They, they didn't say,
'You got to move your fence' or anything else. They said, 'Your cows are on my property.'"
(emphasis added); id. at 15 ("couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through
the fence. And that doesn V make good neighbors, but some of the fence was older. It was rusty wire
so we had to replace the fencing when we went to the livestock operation.") (emphasis added).)
The parties do not contest that their predecessors never had any discussion or discussions
about the Fence, or whether the Fence was or was not a boundary. Factual Background, *[[ 59. As
noted in Veibell, however, "[ajcquiescence may also be^shown by silence, or the failure of a party
to object to a line as a boundary." 2004 UT P 25. Here, as in Stoker, "[t]here is no indication in the
record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief that the fence
line was the boundary." 785 P.2d at 420. The Court notes that its conclusion of mutual acquiescence
is not based solely on the silent and implicit acquiescence by the former landowners but also their
affirmative acts described above.
This case may also be distinguished from the recent cases of Brown v. J orgens en and Argyle
v. Jones. In Jorgensen, the Court of Appeals of Utah concluded that while one of the adjoining
landowners "subjectively believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually
communicated their belief to [the adjoining landowner], either by word or action. Therefore, there
was no 'actual acknowledgment... that the parties treat the Fence as the common boundary.'" 2006
UT P 16. Additionally, the court noted the trial court's finding that one of the adjoining landowners
commissioned an informal survey of his parcel "showed an unwillingness to acknowledge the Fence
as the boundary," and that his unwillingness was factually "sufficient to defeat the doctrine." Id No
evidence of a similar unwillingness to acknowledge the Fence in this case has been presented.
Likewise, in Argyle v Jones, the Court of Appeals noted three facts found by the district court that
were suggestive of non-acquiescence: (1) that the Joneses "had 'minimal' contact with the disputed
property for the purpose of maintaining a well located near the southwest boundary [,]" which the
Court of Appeals found was, "however minimal," not consistent with acquiescence; (2) the Joneses
had knowledge of the true (record) boundary prior to their purchase of the disputed property; and (3)
the Joneses had "consistently paid taxes on the property since purchasing it in 1961." 2005 UT P 15.
"The knowing payment of taxes on the disputed property . . . is inconsistent with acquiescence." Id.
Here, unlike Argyle, there appears to be no evidence of even "minimal" contact suggestive of non24

acquiescence by the Fowkes and Andiews families, no evidence that the families had laiowledge of
a conflicting lecoid boundaiy pnoi to then pui chases 01 leception of the adjoining pioperties, and
no evidence that the Fowkes family made "blowing payment of taxes on the disputed pi opei ty " Id
(emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
The Couit notes that Kay's motion foi partial summaiyjudgment appeals to seek to establish
a boundaiy othei than the Original Fence m accoidance with the Ludlow suivey lefeienced in
Paragiaph 4 of the Factual Background above The Court concludes that a boundaiy had been
established dining the mutual acquiescence of the Fowkes and Andiews families pnoi to Kay's
pui chase of the piopeity, and that legal title to the Disputed Piopeity pieviously vested in EBF's
piedecessois-m-mteiest and has now theiefoie vested in EBF up to the location of the Ongmal
Fence See Viebell, 2004 UT P 31 (cc[o]nce adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary foi
a long penod of time, the opeiation of the doctime of boundaiy by acquiescence is not vitiated by
a subsequent discovery of the true lecord boundaiy by one of the parties ") The Court concludes no
material issues of fact are m dispute and that judgment may be gi anted as a mattei of law The Court
accordingly giants EBF's requests m full, and does not reach Kay's claims of a diffeient boundaiy
based on the Ludlow suivey
First, on its quiet title claim, EBF is granted (1) a judgment and deciee of quiet title to the
disputed piopeity in favoi of EBF and against Kay, (2) a judgment and a deciee (a) declaring that
Kay and any otheis claiming through him, have no light, title, estate, mteiest m, or hen upon, the
disputed property, and (b) peimanently enjoining Kay, and all otheis claiming thiough him, from
encioaching upon oi asserting any adveise claim to the disputed pioperty, and (3) an ordei lequnmg
Kay to lemove the new fence constructed on the disputed property Second, as to its trespass claim,
EBF is granted a judgment m its favoi and against Kay, m an amount to be deteimined at a later
time, foi damages caused by Kay's trespass upon the disputed property EBF additionally is granted
an oi dei dismissing Kay's cause of action foi quiet title with prejudice Accoidmgly, Kay's motion
foi partial summary judgment and motion to stiike are denied
EBF shall prepare and submit the appropriate order m confoimity with the Utah Rules of
Civil Pioceduie

a

sdlthis
lO day of May, 2008
Signed
\ b s iO_

DCWALD! EYRE
Distnct Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on tire
day of May, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing RULING AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DEFENDANT STEVEN L. KAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE to be delivered to tire following
parties:
Sherman C. Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North, Suite 110
P.O. Box 657
Provo,Utah 84603
Robert L. Janicki
H. Burt Ringwood
Strong & Harmi
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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